Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1992

Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The
Secession of Staten Island As a Case Study in the Dilemmas of
Local Self-Determination
Richard Briffault
Columbia Law School, brfflt@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Briffault, Voting Rights, Home Rule, and Metropolitan Governance: The Secession of Staten Island
As a Case Study in the Dilemmas of Local Self-Determination, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 775 (1992).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/15

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

VOTING RIGHTS, HOME RULE, AND METROPOLITAN
GOVERNANCE: THE SECESSION OF STATEN
ISLAND AS A CASE STUDY IN THE DILEMMAS
OF LOCAL SELF-DETERMINATION
RichardBriffault*
On January 1, 1898, amid fanfare and celebration, the city of
Greater New York--"the greatest experiment in municipal government
the world has ever known" '-was born. The consolidation of the cities,
counties, and towns on the New York State side of New York Harbor
into one great metropolis was a capstone to one century of rapid economic and population growth and a fitting harbinger of a new century
of urban greatness for the region and, indeed, the nation. Now, with
another century mark approaching, there is a distinct possibility that
the City of New York, already beset by a host of economic and social
ills, may not make it to its own centennial intact. The New York State
legislature has authorized the residents of one of the five boroughs 2Staten Island-to initiate a process of secession and incorporation into
a separate city of their own. 3
The secession of Staten Island has elicited a host of divergent reactions, ranging from the hyperbolic to the humorous. The proponents
of secession, seeing themselves currently relegated to a "neo-colonial
status" 4 by an inattentive City government, dot their manifestoes with
references to the American Revolution, 5 Lithuania, 6 the Berlin Wall,
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., Columbia, 1974;
J.D., Harvard, 1977. Research for this Article was supported by a grant from The Walter
E. Meyer Research in Law and Social Problems Fund. I would like to thank Vicki Been,
Joel Mintz, Michael Schill, and the participants in the Tulane Law School Faculty
Seminar Series on Democratic Responsibility for their thoughtful comments and
criticisms.
1. John A. Krout, Framing the Charter, in The Greater City: New York 1898-1948,
at 41 (Allan Nevins & John A. Krout eds., 1948) (quoting editorial of the New York
Tribune, January 1, 1898).
2. The City of New York is organized into five boroughs: the Bronx, Brooklyn,
Manhattan, Queens and Staten Island. See New York City Admin. Code & Charter tit. 2,
§ 2-202 (1991). These correspond to the five New York state counties of Bronx, Kings,
New York, Queens and Richmond. At the time of the consolidation of Greater New
York, the territory popularly known as Staten Island was incorporated into the City as
the borough of Richmond. In 1975, the name was changed to the borough of Staten
Island. See New York, Local Laws No. 2 (1975).
3. 1989 N.Y. Laws 3281, ch. 773, as amended by 1990 N.Y. Laws 22, ch. 17.
4. John J. Marchi, State Senator Disputes Article on Secession, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 13,
1991, at 2.
5. See Alessandra Stanley, Staten Islanders Brace for Vote on Secession, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 26, 1990, at BI, B4 (quoting a Staten Island resident and secession
supporter, "It's the same as the Revolution in 1776 .... ").
6. See Charles Millard, Jr., Baltic Fever: It Can Happen Here, N.Y. Newsday, May
17, 1990, at 74; cf. Staten Island; Free the 380,000, The Economist, Jan. 6, 1990, at 31
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the Iron Curtain, and "the tide of freedom.., rolling across Europe
and Asia."' 7 New York City's Mayor Dinkins has warned of secession as
"a step into the night, along a treacherous and foggy path that has
never been taken." 8 Many press accounts, by contrast, have found the
matter risible, labelling Staten Island's move a "sitcom secession" 9 and
conjuring up images of Fort Sumter on the Hudson and City troops
charging across the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge from Brooklyn 10
to put
11
down the rebellion of the "Confederate States of New York."
The possible secession of Staten Island, while not exactly of the
same world-historical dimensions as the dissolution of the Soviet Union
into its component republics, is not a laughing matter either. With
nearly 380,000 people, 12 an independent Staten Island would be the
second largest city in New York State,' 3 and the 36th largest city in
the United States, 1 4 with roughly the same population and area as
Pittsburgh.1 5 The secession of Staten Island would be the first significant subtraction of territory from a major American city.16 At a time of
("The Soviet Union's Baltic republics, it seems, are not the only places where citizens
are trying to break away from an overcentralised, over-bureaucratic government.").
7. Letter of State Senator John J. Marchi to Governor Mario Cuomo 2 (Dec. 7,
1989) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
8. Bob Liff, A Tentative Step Toward SI City; Secession vote likely to pass, but then
what?, N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 1, 1990, at 17.
9. Elizabeth Kolbert, Staten Island Is Voting, but It's Only a Sitcom Secession, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 11, 1990, § 4, at 22.
10. Liff, supra note 8, at 17.
11. Higher Taxes, Naked Statues, Secession Again, Wash. Times, Oct. 26, 1990, at
F2.
12. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990 Census of Population and
Housing: Summary Population and Housing Characteristics New York 55 (1991)
[hereinafter 1990 New York Census Summary] (official Staten Island population is
378,977).
13. Currently, the second largest city in New York State is Buffalo, with an official
population of 328,123. Id. at 7.
14. According to 1988 Census estimates, Staten Island's population falls between
the 35th largest city, Tucson, Arizona, and the 36th largest city, Albuquerque, New
Mexico. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the
United States at 34-36 (110th ed. 1990).
15. According to the 1990 Census, Pittsburgh has a population of 369,879 and a
land area of 55.6 square miles. Staten Island has about 9,000 more people and three
more square miles. Compare Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1990
Census of Population and Housing: Summary Population and Housing Characteristics,
Pennsylvania 526 (1991) with 1990 New York Census Summary, supra note 12, at 364.
For a comparison of Staten Island and Pittsburgh, see Graduate School of Political
Management, A Study of the Feasibility of an Independent Staten Island 18-19 (1990)
[hereinafter Independence Feasibility Study].
16. Detachments of territory from incorporated municipalities, which would
include actions by these cities to release the land from municipal control as well as
decisions by residents of the territory to leave the municipality, are a standard form of
municipal reorganization but are "usually quite small compared to municipal
annexations." Joel C. Miller, Municipal Annexation and Border Change, in The
Municipal Year Book 1988, at 59, 60 (Int'l City Management Ass'n ed., 1988). From

1992]

LOCAL SELF-DETERMINATION

widespread and chronic urban stress, the political break-up of the nation's largest city would be of enormous symbolic significance, with im17
plications for the governance of other major urban centers.
For legal scholars, the Staten Island secession raises a number of
difficult disputes-disputes that nicely illustrate several dilemmas at the
very heart of the notion of local self-government: What is a proper unit
of local self-government, and how is that to be determined when two
local governments quarrel over the same territory? What is the scope
of home rule in the determination of local boundary questions? What
is the appropriate structure of governance in metropolitan areas?
This Article explores these issues. Part I traces the historical, political, and legal background to the current Staten Island secession dispute. It gives particular attention to the claim that secession is justified
by recent changes in the structure of New York City's government that
are said to have altered the terms pursuant to which Staten Island first
agreed to join the consolidated City. Parts II and III consider the process of secession. Under legislation adopted by New York State, the
power to determine secession has been vested in the people of Staten
Island, voting in a referendum, and in the state legislature. The rest of
1980 through 1986, detachments averaged 29.5 square miles, or about 4.4% of the land
area of annexations during the same period. When measured by population involved,
"detachments are even more trivial," averaging about 1,800 persons annually, or less
than 17 of the population of areas annexed. Id.
In recent decades, the most significant detachments have been 15 square miles from
Savannah, Georgia (subsequently recaptured by the city), 36 square miles from Mobile,
Alabama, and 32 square miles of recently annexed open territory from Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. See Joel C. Miller, Municipal Annexation and Border Change, in The
Municipal Year Book 1986 at 72, 78 (Int'l City Management Ass'n ed., 1986)
[hereinafter Municipal Yearbook 1986]. The aggregate population of all territories
detached from all municipalities nationwide between 1970 and 1985 was 119,000-or
less than one-third of the population of Staten Island. See Joel C. Miller, Municipal
Annexation and Border Change, in The Municipal Year Book 1987 at 63, 73 (Int'l City
Management Ass'n ed., 1987).
17. Currently, there are active secessionist movements in at least three other large
cities: San Francisco, California, Dallas, Texas, and Boston, Massachusetts. See Perry
Lang, Bayview Group Proposes Secession From SF; Club Says City Not Spending
Enough in Area, San Francisco Chronicle, Oct. 16, 1991, at A15; Elizabeth Hudson,
Secession Fever, 87 Years Old, Is on the Rise in Texas Neighborhood, Wash. Post, Nov.
23, 1990, at A3; John Racine, Secession is the Talk of Oak Cliff: Dallas Neighborhood
Says it is Being Shortchanged, Bond Buyer, Oct. 9, 1990, at 4; Derrick Z. Jackson, Let
Roxbury Study Secession, Boston Globe, Oct. 26, 1990, at 23 (Roxbury secession
received more than one-third of votes cast in 1988 referendum).
Moreover, the Staten Island secession legislation has sparked a secession proposal
in Queens, New York City's second-largest borough. Maurice Carroll, 'Victimized'
Queens Considers Going Solo, N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 19, 1991, at 22; Queen, Civic
Leaders Mull Boro Secession Bid, N.Y. Newsday, Queens Ed., Oct. 13, 1991, at 2. In
April 1992, the New York Senate passed a bill establishing a secession procedure for
Queens that parallels the Staten Island process. See Kevin Sack, State Senate Passes Bill
to Allow Queens to Begin Secession Effort, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1992, at B4.
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New York City is entirely locked out of the process.1 8 The City has
sought to deploy two legal arguments to pry its way in: (i) that the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the right to vote prohibits the
state from excluding the voters resident in the other four boroughs
from voting in the secession referendum; and (ii) that the home rule
provision of the New York Constitution limits the state's power to act
without the City's consent when, as the City alleges to be the case here,
the "property, affairs, or government" of the City are concerned.
As will be seen in Part II, the resolution of the referendum voting
question requires a determination of what is the proper unit for local
self-determination; yet the voting rights issue has arisen precisely because the proper unit of local self-determination is in dispute. All three
parties to the emerging conflict over secession-Staten Islanders, the
City of New York, and the State of New York-have sought to wrap
themselves in the mantle of local self-determination. Staten Islanders
make a political claim to separate municipal existence and to a process
in which they may choose independence without the involvement of the
rest of the City. The State asserts the power to promote Staten Island's
self-government without seeking the City's consent or according its
voters a role in the process. The City, in turn, asserts that its selfgovernment is at stake and that the City and its citizens have legal rights
to participate in the process that might lead to its break-up. The blessings of local self-government are virtually axiomatic in most contemporary legal scholarship but, as will be seen below, the notion of local selfgovernment provides little guidance for deciding what is the locality in
which local self-government is to occur, and how that is to be determined when two local units claim the same territory.
Part III will examine the effect of the state constitutional provision
for local home rule 19 on secession. Like the voting rights issue, the
home rule question is in part a dispute over the proper definition of
one local unit vis-A-vis another, but home rule raises issues concerning
the vertical as well as the horizontal distribution of political power.
What is the proper authority of the state legislature with respect to local boundaries? Does the state have the power to break up a city whose
home rule is secured by the state constitution in order to promote the
autonomy interest of a subunit of that city?
The "state-or-local" question is as knotty as the "which is the
proper local unit" question with which it is so closely intertwined.
Although state laws on local matters are often portrayed as efforts by a
hierarchically superior level of government to arrogate power to itself
at the expense of localities, in the case of Staten Island the state is pro18. The City's only "participation" is through its representatives in the state
legislature.
19. Home rule is the generic term for state constitutional provisions that provide a
degree of protection for the structural integrity of local governments and authorize
localities to adopt local legislation with respect to local matters.
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moting not its own power but, instead, one local interest against another. The state is arguably transgressing the home rule protection the
constitution affords New York City, but it is doing so in order to advance the home rule claim of Staten Islanders. Current home rule doctrine is unable to deal with this secession case. I will propose a
procedure for reconciling the competing and legitimate interests of the
state, the city, and the secessionist borough.
Finally, Part IV considers the question of secession from the perspective of contemporary debates over the proper political organization
of metropolitan areas. At one time, urbanists were dismayed by the
extensive fragmentation of most metropolitan areas into dozens, if not
scores, of municipalities, 20 and called for more consolidated areawide
governments. 2 1 But today many local government scholars praise metropolitan fragmentation on economic and political grounds, contending that it facilitates the accommodation of differences in personal
preferences for public goods and services, generates the interlocal
competition that promotes governmental efficiency, and preserves opportunities for political participation at the local level. 2 2 The implica-

tion is that leviathan cities like New York ought to be broken up.
Although the asserted values of interlocal competition and enhanced opportunities for local "voice" in fragmented areas tend to
counsel in favor of fragmentation, I will suggest that there are serious
countervailing economic, political, and social concerns which make the
issue highly uncertain. Ultimately, there may be no neutral, "scientific"
answer concerning the optimal structure for metropolitan governance:
23
different structures will favor or harm different interests.
Secession is particularly problematic since it goes beyond the already fragmented metropolitan status quo and breaks up an existing
municipality. Even though there is no standard for the optimal size of a
municipality or the ideal structure of a metropolitan area, so that the
independence of the secessionist subunit might have been appropriate
when the municipality was originally formed, a subsequent secession is
troublesome because it suggests that different groups and interests in a
20. William A. Fischel, Is Local Government Structure in Urbanized Areas
Monopolistic or Competitive?, 34 Nat'l TaxJ. 95, 96 (1981) (in 21 of the nation's 25
largest urbanized areas there are 20 or more general purpose local governments; in 12
areas there are more than 50 general purpose local governments; in 6 areas there are
more than 100 general purpose local governments).
21. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Modernizing Local
Government 12-13 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Vincent Ostrom et al., Local Government in the United States (1988);
Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Metropolitan Organization and Governance: A
Local Public Economy Approach, 25 Urb. Aff. Q. 18 (1989).
23. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (with Special Reference

to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 5-13 (1992)
(examining how "neutral" principles frequently precede from, and disguise, a particular
baseline distribution of rights and benefits).

780

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 92:775

complex urban setting cannot coexist in one democratically governed
local unit; A secession may be justified by a showing that the area seeking secession is so exploited by the rest of the City that fairness requires that it be separated from the City, 24 but a heavy burden of proof
ought to be placed on secession's advocates to demonstrate such a case
of exploitation. In the absence of such a showing, one hopes that a
commitment to the resolution of intralocal conflicts according to democratic processes within a locality will militate against secession.
I.

FROM CONSOLIDATION TO SECESSION

A. The Process of Consolidation
The consolidation of Greater New York at the end of the nineteenth century was the culmination of more than a decade of intensive
debate, deliberation, legislative lobbying, and political jockeying. The
consolidation movement was spearheaded by a coalition of New York
civic and mercantile leaders who saw unified municipal control over the
territory surrounding New York harbor as essential to the area's continued economic development. Consolidation encountered considerable
local opposition, from real estate and taxpayer interests in New York
City-at that time, the island of Manhattan and a small piece of what is
now the Bronx2 5 -who feared having to bear the costs of physical improvements to the less developed areas proposed for consolidation,
and, especially, from many people who lived in Brooklyn, who desired
to preserve their city's independence. Moreover, although consolidation won approval of metropolitan area voters in an advisory referendum, the critical political and legal decisions for consolidation were
taken by New York's upstate Republican leadership, often over the opposition of New York City's own elected officials. In all this, Staten
Island was a minor player 26-albeit
one most enthusiastic for
consolidation.
The first serious step toward Greater New York occurred in 1890
when the state legislature passed an act creating "a commission to inquire into the expediency of consolidating the various municipalities in
the State of New York occupying the several islands in the harbor of
New York. ' 27 The commission, consisting of members appointed by
the governor, the mayors of New York and Brooklyn, and the county
24. See Allen Buchanan, Secession 38-45 (1991).
25. The City of New York first leapt beyond the confines of Manhattan Island in
1874, with the annexation of three townships in what was then the southwestern comer
of Westchester County, but is now a part of the Bronx. See 1873 N.Y. Laws 928, ch.
613.
26. At the time of consolidation, only about two percent of the population of the

area that came to be Greater New York resided on Staten Island. See Wallace S. Sayre &
Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City 18 (1960).
27. 1890 N.Y. Laws #597, ch. 311. The broad scope of the proposal reflected the
vision of Andrew H. Green, the head of the consolidation movement, who had long
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governments of Westchester, Queens, Kings, and Richmond (Staten
Island) promptly and unanimously recommended consolidation,
sought to build popular support for the municipal reorganization, and
urged the legislature to submit the matter to a referendum. The legislature displayed little urgency over the matter and failed to act on consolidation in 1892 or 1893.28 Finally, succumbing to an intensified
lobbying effort, the legislature in 1894 voted to submit the matter to an
advisory referendum of the electorate in the metropolitan area: "[T]he
lobby in favor of the bill had finally convinced the influential leaders at
Albany that a popular referendum on the subject was politically
29
harmless."
In the 1894 referendum, consolidation squeaked through in
Brooklyn-by less than 300 votes out of approximately 129,000. In the
metropolitan area as a whole, the consolidation proposal received fiftyseven percent affirmative support-about the same percentage that it
received in Manhattan. Consolidation received its strongest support on
30
Staten Island, where it was approved by seventy percent of the voters.
The referendum, however, did not lead directly to consolidation.
Popular opposition in both New York City and Brooklyn seemed to
grow after the referendum, and resistance in the legislature stiffened.
During the 1895 legislative session, a bill to permit consolidation failed
in the Senate by two votes, with every senator from Brooklyn and New
York City voting in the negative.3 1
Thereafter the state's Republican leader, "Boss" Platt, came out
for consolidation and decided
to push it through the 1896 legislature
"regardless of opposition." 3 2 After a considerable effort by Platt and a
deal with Tammany Hall, the legislature approved a consolidation bill.
At this point, the consolidation process ran into the home rule provision that was a part of the New York Constitution adopted in 1894.
Article XII of the new constitution provided for the classification of the
cities of the state according to population, declared that any law that
related to "a single city, or to less than all the cities in a class" was a
"special law," and directed that any special law "relating to the property, affairs, or government of cities" must be sent to the city concerned
insisted on unified government of "our three islands, Manhattan, Long and Staten...
buttresses and breakwaters of a capacious harbor." Krout, supra note 1, at 46.
28. See David C. Hammack, Power and Society: Greater New York at the Turn of
the Century 204 (1982).
29. See Krout, supra note 1, at 48.
30. See Hammack, supra note 28, at 206. The vote on Staten Island was 5,531 in
favor of consolidation and 1,505 opposed. The aggregate vote for all the jurisdictions
that became Greater New York was 176,170 in favor and 131,706 opposed. Id.
31. See Krout, supra note 1, at 52. The 1895 legislature did authorize New York to
annex additional territory in what was then southern Westchester County, thereby
completing the addition to the city of what was later known as the Bronx. 1895 N.Y.
Laws 1948, ch. 934.
32. Hammack, supra note 28, at 217.
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for its approval.3 3 If that city rejected the special law, the law would
have to be repassed by both houses of the legislature before it could be
34
submitted to the governor for action.
The consolidation bill affected three cities-New York City, Brooklyn, and the then-independent municipality of Long Island City 3 5-and
was treated as a special law. The bill was submitted to the mayors of
the three cities for their review. Although the Mayor of Long Island
City approved the measure, the Mayors of both New York and Brooklyn
vetoed it.36 On legislative reconsideration, the Senate easily repassed
the bill, "but then it nearly stuck in the assembly."'3 7 Tammany, which
had supported the bill on its initial passage, bolted, and many Brooklyn
and upstate Republicans resisted. "Twisting arms and making free use
38
of political threats and promises, Platt forced the measure through."
The Republican leader made the consolidation bill a test of Republican
Party loyalty; even so, "it required all Senator Platt's energy, and the
full weight of his influence throughout the state, to secure a constitutional majority." 3 9 On May 11, 1896, Governor Morton signed the bill
into law.
As enacted, the consolidation measure was silent as to the form of
the new city's government. It simply provided that the consolidated
city would come into existence on January 1, 1898, and created a commission to write a charter. The legislature adopted the commission's
proposed charter in early 1897. Under the home rule article, the charter bill was submitted to the mayors of the affected cities for approval.
Although this time the Mayor of Brooklyn approved, the Mayor of New
York once again exercised his veto. The legislature, however, easily
repassed the measure, providing the new city with a charter in time for
40
its birth.
B. The Morris Litigation and the Secession Legislation
Following consolidation, Staten Island "embarked upon a new,
'4 1
fresh phase of prosperous and satisfactory development.
"[C]onsiderable work was done on the Island's roads," a high school
was built, the water supply improved, and a municipal ferry link to
Manhattan provided by the City. 4 2 Staten Island's population more
33. N.Y. Const. of 1894, art. XII, § 2. There were three population classes for
cities: cities of 250,000 or more; cities of 50,000 to 200,000; and all others.
34. See id.
35. Long Island City is currently a neighborhood in the borough of Queens.
36. See Hammack, supra note 28, at 222.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. In the final roll call only 6 of the 114 Republicans in the Assembly and only
I of the 36 Republicans in the Senate voted in the negative. Krout, supra note 1, at 56.
40. See id. at 59.
41. Henry G. Steinmeyer, Staten Island 1524-1898, at 99 (rev. ed. 1987).
42. See id. at 98. The City took over the ferry from a private line in 1905 and put
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than doubled from 67,000 to 138,000 in the first quarter of the new
century,43 and it enjoyed a second major spurt of growth after the
Verazzano-Narrows Bridge opened in 1964 to provide the first surface
link between the island and the rest of the City. 44 Despite these developments as well as their initial high level of support for consolidation,
Staten Islanders occasionally displayed ambivalence about their affiliation with the rest of the City. Complaints about the City's lack of attention to the "forgotten borough" 4 5 and inadequate investment in local
development alternated with concerns about excessive growth, demographic change, and loss of the Island's suburban charm. Short-lived
secessionist impulses crystallized around various City plans to site undesirable sanitation facilities on the Island and over a proposed mixedincome urban renewal program. 4 6 These disputes were resolved
through the City's cancellation of the proposals that had provoked the
secessionist talk. A serious secessionist movement, however, emerged
in response to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in 1983 that the City's Board of Estimate was subject
47
to the strictures of the "one person, one vote" doctrine.
At the time of the litigation and for most of New York's twentieth
century history, the Board of Estimate wielded broad authority over the
City's land use and zoning process, the disposition of City property,
and the grant of contracts and franchises, and it shared power with the
City Council over the budget. The Board consisted of eight members:
three officials elected on a city-wide basis (the mayor, the comptroller,
and the City Council president) who, at the time of the litigation, cast
two votes apiece, and the five borough presidents, who each cast one
vote.4 8 Given the wide disparity in population among the five boroughs-with Brooklyn, the largest borough, having more than six times
the population of Staten Island, the smallest-the Board had long been
an inviting target for a "one person, one vote" challenge. State and
lower federal courts had previously dismissed "one person, one vote"
claims, finding that the Board was not subject to the constitutional votfive modem boats into service. Staten Island was connected to the City's Catskill Water
Supply in 1917. See id. at 116.

43. See id.
44. Michael N. Danielson &Jameson W. Doig, New York: The Politics of Urban
Regional Development 203 (1982) (Staten Island population increased by 30% in the
six years following the opening of the Bridge).
45. Howard Kurtz, A Low-Profile Borough's High-Stakes Case for Secession, Wash.
Post, Feb. 9, 1988, at A3.

46. See James M. Bohanek, Jr., Staten Island, New York: The Rebellious Borough
10-20, 46-50 (discussing secessionist movements of 1916, 1938, and 1947, which were
responses to City plans for a garbage reduction plant or a garbage dump on Staten
Island, and the secessionist proposal of 1966, provoked by a City plan for urban renewal
housing in South Richmond) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).

47. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 707 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1983).
48. See id. at 687-88.
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ing rule because it lacked general legislative authority49 and because its
members were not elected to the Board, but rather served by virtue of
their election to other posts. 50
In Morris v. Board of Estimate,5 1 the Second Circuit rejected these
arguments and found the Board to be an elective body with broad governmental authority, and therefore subject to "one person, one vote."
Although the Court remanded for a determination of how much inequality existed given the Board's unusual mix of city-wide and borough
representatives, and for consideration of whether the City could justify
the deviations from equality that resulted, the 1983 decision was the
52
beginning of the end for the Board.
The Board's death knell sounded particularly ominous on Staten
Island, which had been the greatest beneficiary of the "one borough,
one vote" rule.5 3 Some Staten Islanders had long felt that their borough was short-changed by the City's administration,5 4 and that the
City treated the Island as a dumping ground for the City's undesirable
facilities. 55 The further loss of political clout threatened to turn an already unpleasant situation into an intolerable one. The Borough
President announced that if the Board of Estimate were ultimately held
to be unconstitutional, he would have to consider secession; and the
borough's senior political figure, State Senator John Marchi, issued a
report justifying secession as an alternative to remaining in a City without equal borough representation on the Board of Estimate. 6
The secession issue remained relatively quiescent as the Morris litigation continued to wend its way through the federal courts, but be49. See, e.g., Bergerman v. Lindsay, 255 N.E.2d 142, 146 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1969),
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 955 (1970).
50. See, e.g., Morris v. Board of Estimate, 551 F. Supp. 652, 656 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
51. 707 F.2d 686, 690 (2d Cir. 1983).
52. On remand, the district court determined that equal voting strength for each
borough president, despite the differences in borough population, resulted in a
deviation from equality of 132.9% between the smallest and largest borough, see Morris
v. Board of Estimate, 592 F. Supp. 1462, 1470 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), and that this deviation
was not justified by any of the political or historical reasons the City presented in
support of the principle of borough equality, see Morris v. Board of Estimate, 647 F.
Supp. 1463, 1408-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). These rulings were affirmed by the Second
Circuit. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 831 F.2d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 1987).
53. Only one other borough, the Bronx, has a population below the borough mean,
and its deviation from the mean is relatively slight. See Morris v. Board of Estimate, 592
F. Supp. 1462, 1475 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
54. See, e.g., Remedies of a Proud Outcast: The Legal Probability and Implications
of Restructuring the Government and Boundaries of the City of New York, A Staff
Report to the Chairman of the New York Senate Finance Committee 1-2 (July 1983)
[hereinafter Remedies of a Proud Outcast].
55. Staten Island literally is the City's "dumping ground": it is the site of Fresh
Kills, the landfill that receives most of the City's solid waste. According to one study, of
the 5.2 million tons of garbage deposited there each year only 371,000 are generated on
Staten Island itself. Independence Feasibility Study, supra note 15, at 14.
56. See Remedies of a Proud Outcast, supra note 54, at 26.
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came reanimated in March of 1989, when the Supreme Court affirmed
the Second Circuit's 1987 determination that the "one borough, one
vote" rule was unconstitutional. 5 7 The Morris decision, and the subsequent action of New York City's Charter Revision Commission to abolish the Board and redistribute its powers, caused deep dismay on
Staten Island. The Island's Democratic Borough President, in a difficult reelection battle, came out for secession, and Senator Marchi, a
Republican and an important member of the State Senate's leadership,
persuaded the Senate to consider his bill authorizing secession.
Whether out of deference to a senior leader, or on the assumption that
the measure would die in the Democratic-controlled Assembly-or
both-secession sailed through the Senate by a vote of 58 to 1.
In the Assembly, the Democratic members from Staten Island importuned the Democratic leadership to allow the measure to be taken
up. They argued that their local political futures depended on being
able to say they had taken a strong stand for secession. 58 The Assembly's Democratic leadership, sensitive to the needs of fellow Democrats
from Staten Island and apparently assuming they could count on the
Governor to veto the measure, placed the secession bill on the
agenda.5 9 The bill passed the Assembly by a vote of 117 to 21. That
few who voted for the bill thought it would become law may be illustrated by the fact that 32 out of 51 Assemblymembers from the other
60
four boroughs of New York City voted in favor of the secession bill.
The Governor, however, signed the bill.
As passed by the legislature, Senator Marchi's bill provided for
submission to the voters of Staten Island the question: "Shall the borough of Staten Island separate from the city of New York to become the
city of Staten Island?" In the event of an affirmative vote, the bill provided for the creation of a commission, appointed by Staten Islanders
and senior state officials and consisting entirely of Staten Island residents, 6 1 to draft a charter for Staten Island for submission to the Staten
Island electorate. 62 If the Staten Island voters approved the charter,
Staten Island would then become independent, with the charter as its
57. Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989), aff'g 831 F.2d 384 (2d Cir.
1987).
58. See Kolbert, supra note 9, § 4, at 22.
59. Id.
60. See Defendant's Memorandum of Law on Summary Judgment Motion at 6-7,
City of New York v. State, 556 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (No. 46770/89).
61. The Commission consists of the members of the state legislature representing
Staten Island and additional members appointed separately by the Governor, the
temporary President of the Senate, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the legislators

representing Staten Island. All appointed Commission members must be Staten Island
residents. 1989 N.Y. Laws 2356, ch. 773 § 4(a).
62. The bill provided for the submission of the proposed charter to the Governor,
the leaders of the state legislature, and the Staten Island Borough President, but did not
condition the effectiveness of the charter or of secession on the approval of any of these
officials. Id. at § 4(c).
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governing instrument. 63
In his memorandum approving the bill, and in other public commentary, Governor Cuomo chose to characterize the bill as primarily an
opportunity for the voters of Staten Island to consider secession, not as
64
a measure leading ineluctably to separation from New York City.
Moreover, the Governor linked his approval of the secession referendum bill to the adoption of supplemental legislation that required state
legislative approval of secession and of the proposed Staten Island
charter before either could become effective. After considerable behind-the-scenes bargaining, and in the face of growing New York City
opposition, this amendment passed, by a substantial 51 to 6 margin in
the Senate and an only slightly narrower 94 to 36 vote in the
65
Assembly.
Under the bill as amended, the procedure for secession comprises
the following:
an initial referendum to be held in 1990 to determine whether
the voters of Staten Island wish to create a charter commission
to provide for the separation of the borough from the City of
New York and to establish an independent city;
if the referendum question passes, appointment of a Staten Island Charter Commission;
a two to two-and-one-half year process of Commission deliberation and preparation of a charter;
a referendum of the voters of Staten Island on the proposed
charter;
if the proposed charter wins referendum approval, legislative
determination of whether to adopt legislation "enabling the
borough of Staten Island to disengage and separate from the
city of New York."
Upon adoption of the enabling legislation, Staten Island would become
66
an independent city under its own charter.
Although the Governor characterized the amendment to the secession law as appropriate "to meet the unarguably desirable objective of
involvement by the whole state through its elected representatives,"
more cynical observers labelled the amendment "lawsuit insurance"
designed to shield the secession procedure from New York City's claim
that it violated the home rule provision of the state constitution without
63. The secession measure also provided that if the charter failed to win voter
approval, the Charter Commission could be given the opportunity to prepare and
submit a second charter for voter consideration. Id. at § 4(e).
64. See Executive Memorandum approving L. 1989, ch. 773, Dec. 15, 1989,
Session Laws of New York 2438 (McKinney's 1989); Governor Mario Cuomo, Letter to
the Editor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1990, at A18.

65. This time the assemblymembers from the other four boroughs voted against
the measure, 35 to 15. See Affidavit ofJoel Berger at Exhibit A, City of New York v.
State, 556 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (No. 46770/89).
66. 1990 N.Y. Laws 35-36, ch. 17 § 3.
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actually giving the City any formal role in the process. 6 7
The City of New York attempted, without success, to block the
1990 referendum. Both the trial court that first heard the City's case
and the intermediate appellate court firmly rejected the City's position
that all City voters had a right to participate in the referendum and that
the secession legislation violated the home rule provisions of the state
constitution because the consent of the City had not been sought. Both
courts ruled broadly that the local boundary questions underlying the
two legal issues fell within the plenary authority of the legislature to
68
resolve.
The state's highest court, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the lower
court rulings and authorized the referendum to go forward, but it did
so on narrow grounds that left open the constitutionality of a final decision by the legislature to separate Staten Island from New York City
without the City's consent. In City of New York v. State of New York (the
Secession Referendum case) 6 9 the Court of Appeals emphasized that
the initial secession referendum would not decide the secession question or commit the state to support secession. Since its outcome would
have no "direct effect" on the City of New York, home rule was not
implicated. 70 Nor did the limitation of the referendum electorate to
Staten Island residents infringe the voting rights of other New Yorkers,
since in the court's view, the referendum was simply intended "to allow
Staten Island voters to express their views as to whether, and how, they
might wish to separate from New York City-while affording them no
unilateral right to do so."'7 1 Two members of the court dissented on
home rule grounds.
The referendum on whether to create a charter commission and
initiate the secession process was held in November 1990, and Staten
Islanders voted in7 2the affirmative by a margin of eighty-two percent to
eighteen percent.
67. See Elaine Rivera, Bill Passed Letting State, Not City, OK SI Secession,
Newsday, Mar. 1, 1990, at 18. According to Assemblywoman Elizabeth Connelly, "the
bill still allows the people of Staten Island to decide their own destiny. And hopefully
this will address the lawsuit." Id. Accord Victor A. Kovner, Staten Island Secession,
N.Y. LJ., Apr. 17, 1991, at 2 (New York City corporation counsel contends that the
governor's counsel sought immediate passage of the amendment to the secession law
"because the city might prevail in its lawsuit if there were no amendment").
68. See City of New York v. State, 557 N.Y.S.2d 914, 917 (App. Div.), aff'g 556
N.Y.S.2d 823, 827 (Sup. Ct. 1990).
69. 562 N.E.2d 118, 120 (N.Y. 1990).
70. See id. at 120.
71. Id. at 121.
72. See Alessandra Stanley, Secession; Staten Island Votes a Resounding Yes on
Taking Step Toward Separation, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1990, at B7 (with 94% of precincts
reporting). Voter turnout on Staten Island for the 1990 general election was only 44%,
but that was a significantly higher turnout than in the other four boroughs. See Maurice
Carroll, Desperately Seeking Lost Voters, N.Y. Newsday, Nov. 27, 1990, at 19.
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C. Was the Board of Estimate "Part of the Deal"for Consolidation?
As Governor Cuomo noted in his approval message, the secession
movement is fueled by a "long list of grievances by the people of Staten
Island over the years," and by a sense of Staten Island's differences
from the rest of the City. But the catalyst for secession was the demise
of the Board of Estimate, with its "one borough, one vote" rule, and
the concomitant reduction of Staten Island's power in the City's governing structure. For some proponents of secession and their sympathizers, the abolition of the Board was not simply a loss of power but an
alteration of the very basis upon which Staten Island had entered
73
Greater New York.
This sense of the betrayal of the terms of an original consolidation
agreement, captured by Governor Cuomo's phrase, as reported in the
newspapers, that the Board of Estimate was "part of the deal" 74 for
consolidation, has added an extra degree of aggrieved legitimacy to
what otherwise might be seen as a parochial desire for Staten Islanders
to separate from New York City and its problems.
Indeed, political theorists who have studied secession in the international setting have urged that "a sound justification for secession
must include a justification for taking the seceding territory. '75 Secession involves more than just the decision by a group of people, dissatisfied with their government, to leave the jurisdiction. In a secession,
people are determined to leave the jurisdiction and to take their territory
with them. 76 To provide an argument for secession with some legitimacy, secessionists must have "a normatively sound claim to territory."'7 7 Most commonly, this will entail a "historical grievance," such

as the claim that the territory was wrongfully or unjustly seized by the
jurisdiction that currently controls it. 7 8 The secession of the Baltic
States from the Soviet Union is, perhaps, the clearest modern example
73. See, e.g., Letter of Edward J. Maloy III, Chairman of the Board of the Staten
Island Chamber of Commerce, to Governor Mario Cuomo, Dec. 9, 1989 (justifying
consideration of secession "since the status which was negotiated upon affiliation has
been involuntarily terminated" by the elimination of Board of Estimate) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
74. Quoted in Bob Liff, Road to Secession Would Not be Made Easy for SI, Guy
Says, Newsday, Oct. 26, 1990, at 18; Liff, supra note 8, at 17.
75. Buchanan, supra note 24, at 68.
76. See id. at 10-11 (comparing emigration with secession). Also, secession differs
from revolution in that it does not seek to overthrow an existing government or make
fundamental changes in the existing state. Instead, secessionists seek "to restrict the
jurisdiction of the state in question so as not to include" the secessionists and the
territory they occupy. Id. at 10.
77. Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation,
16 YaleJ. Int'l L. 177, 192 (1991).
78. See Buchanan, supra note 24, at 67-70; Brilmayer, supra note 77, at 189-91;
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633, 661-63
(1991).
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of secession as the rectification of a prior wrongful acquisition of
territory.
In the case of Staten Island, secessionists do not claim that the
original consolidation of Staten Island into Greater New York was an
unjust conquest when it occurred. The argument is, instead, that
Staten Island's consent to consolidation was premised on a commitment to borough equality in the City's structure of governance. In
other words, the "one borough, one vote" rule on the Board of
Estimate, or something very much like it, was a "part of the deal" by
which Staten Island agreed to come into the City.
The "part of the deal" argument, however, is historically flawed in
two ways: there was no "deal," and the Board of Estimate was not
''part" of the original consolidation.
The notion of a "deal" suggests that consolidation was the result
of a consensual process, the voluntary coming together of the cities,
counties, and towns surrounding New York harbor on mutually-agreedupon terms, in particular, the Board of Estimate.79 But that was not the
case. As my brief history of the consolidation process indicates,
Greater New York was put together in Albany by state politicians.
Although Staten Island and other metropolitan area voters had supported consolidation in a referendum, that referendum was advisory,
without legally binding effect. Indeed, as the travails of the consolidation proposal in the 1895 and 1896 legislative sessions indicate, the
referendum had little immediate precatory effect either. Consolidation
was imposed over the opposition of the Mayors of New York and
Brooklyn and of most of the state legislators elected from those two
cities. There was certainly no "deal" involving the communities that
became the five boroughs. With the exception of the tiny municipality
of Long Island City, it is difficult to say that any local government that
became a part of Greater New York actually "consented" to
consolidation.8 0
Nor was the Board of Estimate-or the principle of borough equality-part of consolidation. When Staten Island voters and other metropolitan area residents voted on the idea of consolidation in 1894, there
was no charter before them. Similarly, in 1896, the state legislature
imposed consolidation without establishing a structure for the new
79. As the Chairman of the Board of the Staten Island Chamber of Commerce put
it, "Staten Island took voluntary legislative action to accomplish its affiliation with the
City of New York and did so only after ensuring that its voice would not be muffled by
the more populous boroughs by advocating for the creation of the Board of Estimate."
Malloy, supra note 73.
80. Cf. Gregory Craven, Secession: The Ultimate States Right 74-81 (1986)
(discussing and rejecting argument that Australian states enjoy a right of secession from
Australian federation because British Parliament's adoption of the act creating the
federation followed Australian voters' approval of the federation in a referendum; the
popular vote, even though a factual predicate to federation, "was legally a mere
antecedent historical circumstance").
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city's government. When a charter was approved in 1897, it contained
nothing like the Board of Estimate of the 1980s or the principle of borough equality.8 1
The first charter for consolidated Greater New York vested all legislative power and final budget authority in a bicameral Municipal Assembly. The smaller house, the City Council, had twenty-nine
members, of whom two were to come from Staten Island;8 2 in the
larger house, the Board of Aldermen, Staten Island would get one out
of sixty seats. 83 With three seats in the fifty-one-member City Council
of 1992, Staten Island is certainly not getting less representation than it
did in 1898.
The 1897 Charter did preserve New York's Board of Estimate and
Apportionment, which had been created in the unconsolidated city in
1873 to manage the budget. But the Board had no borough represent84
atives, and was instead dominated by the mayor and his appointees.
The only role for borough representatives at the city-wide level was on
the Board of Public Improvements, which was created to regulate capital expenditures. Borough presidents sat on this Board, but they could
vote on only those matters that concerned their own boroughs, thus
assuring that the Board of Public Improvements would be dominated
by the city-wide members. 8 5 Within their own boroughs the borough
presidents had relatively little power beyond making recommendations
to the Municipal Assembly and the Board of Public Improvements for
the undertaking of improvements and the regulation of nuisances, dis6
orderly houses, and saloons.8
The modern Board of Estimate did not emerge until'a charter revision in 1901, which abolished the City Council and vested both the
Council's budgetary authority and the functions of the Board of Public
Improvements in the Board of Estimate. The 1901 Charter altered the
Board's membership to include the mayor, the comptroller, the president of the Board of Aldermen, and the five borough presidents. Even
then, the Charter did not embrace the principle of borough equality:
81. See 1897 N.Y. Laws, ch. 378 (bound separately).

82. See 1897 N.Y. Laws, ch. 378 §§ 18-19 (bound separately). The Council
consisted of a president, elected city-wide, and 28 members elected from 10 districts.
Manhattan was given 12 members; Brooklyn, 9; the Bronx 3; Queens 2, and Staten
Island 2. See id. § 19.
83. See 1897 N.Y. Laws, ch. 378 § 24 (bound separately). The Board of Aldermen
were elected from the state assembly districts within New York City.
84. The Board had 5 members: the mayor, the independently elected comptroller;
the independently elected president of the Board of Aldermen; and two mayoral
appointees-the president of the Department of Taxes and Assessment, and the
corporation counsel. See 1897 N.Y. Laws, ch. 378 § 226 (bound separately).
85. The Board consisted of the mayor, the comptroller, the corporation counsel,
the Board's president, six other city commissioners-all mayoral appointees-and the
five borough presidents. See 1897 Laws, ch. 378 § 410 (bound separately).
86. See 1897 N.Y. Laws, ch. 378 § 393 (bound separately).
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the Borough Presidents of Manhattan and Brooklyn, the two most populous boroughs, each had two votes, while the other three borough
presidents were given one vote apiece. 87 Borough equality did not arrive at the Board of Estimate until 1958, when the presidents of all five
88
boroughs were first given an equal number of votes.
Thus, neither the Board of Estimate nor the principle of borough
equality were part of the structure of the City's governance at the time
of consolidation. The Morris decision and the 1989 New York City
Charter revision8 9 did not undo any agreement which was the predicate
for Staten Island's consolidation into New York City.
To be sure, the Staten Islanders' case for secession has not been
premised solely on this historical claim. As Governor Cuomo's approval message indicates, current grievances and the "relatively small
participation" of Staten Island in the City's governance following the
demise of the Board of Estimate are important motivating concerns.
Indeed, the Governor in his formal statements has refrained from any
reference to a historical basis for secession.
Nor do Staten Islanders need to establish a historical claim to their
territory. They have not claimed a legal right of secession that might
be sustained even in the face of state opposition, but rather have advanced a political argument to the legislature that they ought to be allowed to secede. The legal rights formally at stake in this secession are
those of the State of New York, which asserts the power to separate
Staten Island from New York City without the City's participation or
consent, and the City of New York, which denies that the State has that
power. This dispute between the State and City is the focus of the next
two Parts.
II.

THE FEDERAL CONsTrruTION AND LOCAL SECESSION

A. The Right to Vote and Secession Referenda
The principal federal constitutional question raised by a local secession is the right to vote in secession referenda. 90 The State of New
87. In 1900, Manhattan had a population of 1,850,000; Brooklyn, 1,167,000; the

Bronx, 201,000; Queens, 153,000; and Staten Island, 67,000. See Sayre & Kaufman,
supra note 26, at 18.

On the Board of Estimate, the three city-wide officials were given three votes apiece,
thus assuring they could outvote the borough presidents. This guarantee that the citywide officials could outvote the borough presidents remained a constant of the Board's
voting structure through subsequent charter revisions. See R. Alta Charo, Designing
Mathematical Models to Describe One-Person, One-Vote Compliance by Unique

Governmental Structures: The Case of the New York City Board of Estimate, 53
Fordham L. Rev. 735, 743-44 (1985).

88. See 1958 N.Y. Laws 1571, ch. 719. In 1957, the borough populations were:
Brooklyn, 2,602,000; Manhattan, 1,794,000; Queens, 1,763,000; Bronx, 1,424,000; and
Staten Island, 212,000. See Sayre & Kaufman, supra note 26, at 18.
89. See Charter of the City of New York, ch. 8 §§ 203-204.
90. Apart from the constitutional and statutory protections of voting rights and the
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York has limited participation in the two popular votes on secessionthe referendum that initiated the process in 1990 and the future referendum on independence and a charter for Staten Island-to the residents of Staten Island. In the words of Governor Cuomo, "Staten
Island has the right to start it, and Staten Island has the right to finish
it."' 9 1 According to the Governor, the secession debate would be a
"grand new experience" for Staten Islanders and a "golden moment"
for the democratic determination of their collective future.9 2 The secession of Staten Island would also affect the collective future of the
residents of the other four boroughs, however, and they are being left
out of the process.
One method of inserting these other New Yorkers into the secession debate is by way of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of the
right to vote. As the Supreme Court has recognized,9 3 the vote enables
people to voice their concerns, protect their interests, and participate in
the determination of political issues that affect them and their community.9 4 The equal distribution of the franchise is a symbolic statement

of the equal political value of all citizens, much as the denial of the vote
or the provision of an unequally weighted vote denigrates the political
status of the disenfranchised. In a succession of cases in the 1960s and
early 1970s, the Court determined that when a state decided to select
public officials or make public decisions by popular election, a restriction on the right to vote would be subject to "exacting judicial scrugeneral prohibition on racially invidious legislation, see, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339, 349 (1960) (Whittaker, J., concurring) (basing invalidation of state's
racially motivated redrawing of municipal boundaries on equal protection clause of
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than Fifteenth Amendment's ban on race-based
restrictions of right to vote), neither New York City nor its residents would appear to
have any basis for a federal constitutional challenge to state legislation authorizing the
secession. Generally, local governments have no federal constitutional rights against
their states, and local residents have no constitutional claim to belong to a particular
local government. See Richard Briffauh, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 7 & nn.7-9 (1990) [hereinafter Our Localism I].
Federal constitutional concerns could be triggered by other aspects of secession,
such as whether the state's allocation of New York City's debts impairs the security of
New York City's bondholders in violation of the Contracts Clause, or whether the
disposition of the City's property on Staten Island implicates the Takings Clause. See
infra note 259. But Contracts and Takings Clause arguments would not affect the
authority of a state to break up a city or the process the state may utilize in doing so.
91. Bob Liff, Cuomo Signs Secession Bill; Action opposed by Dinkins, SI President,
Newsday, Mar. 2, 1990, at 19.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555-56 (1964).
94. Professor Michelman finds that "[a) person may value enfranchisement in
political affairs ... for either of two types of reasons distinguishable as 'instrumental'
and 'constitutive.'" The instrumental value of voting is "to defend or further interests
formed and defined outside of politics." The constitutive value is the experence of
political engagement itself. Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in
American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 443, 451 (1989).
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tiny" and would need to be closely tailored to meet a compelling state
95
need to survive this scrutiny.
Modem voting jurisprudence is most clearly exemplified by Kramer
v. Union Free School District No. 15,96 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a New York law that limited the right to vote in certain school
board elections to owners or renters of property in the school districtthat is, to direct and indirect payers of the local property tax that
funded the school district-and to parents. The state argued that it
could so limit the franchise because parents and direct and indirect
property taxpayers constituted the members of the community "primarily interested" in or "primarily affected" by school affairs. The
Court found, however, that since other residents of the district were
also "interested in and affected by school board decisions," the state's
limitation on the electorate did not meet "the exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which selectively distribute the
97
franchise."
If taken to its logical conclusion, such an "all-interested" or "allaffected" standard 9 8 would ultimately be destructive of the system of
territorially-based local governments. Local government actions frequently have extralocal effects, and nonresidents may be very interested in the decisions of a particular locality. New Jersey residents who
commute to jobs in New York are affected by and interested in New
York's political and fiscal decisions,just as New Yorkers who live downwind from New Jersey factories or waste disposal sites are affected by
and interested in the land use and zoning decisions of New Jersey municipalities. An all-affected standard would leave the size of local electorates indeterminate and potentially variable from issue to issue,9 9 and
would erode the connection between a particular community and its
representatives. The Supreme Court has recognized these dangers and
has determined that the protection of the right to vote on an equal basis only extends within a political jurisdiction. Bona fide residency requirements can withstand the strict judicial scrutiny applied to
limitations on the franchise because they are "necessary to preserve the
basic conception of a political community." 10 0
95. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972); City of Phoenix v.
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50,

54-55 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969); Kramer v. Union
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 621-28 (1969).

96. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
97. Id. at 632 & n.15.
98. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society 64
(1970) ("Everyone who is affected by the decisions of a government should have the
right to participate in that government.").
99. See Frederick G. Whalen, Prologue: Democratic Theory and the Boundary
Problem, in Liberal Democracy: NOMOS XXV 13, 19

Chapman eds., 1983).
100. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,

(. Roland Pennock & John W.

343-44 (1972).
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B. The Question of Boundaries
Equal protection of the right to vote, thus, only operates within
jurisdictional borders. The problem with the secession referenda is
that the state has created two relevant jurisdictions: the Borough of
Staten Island and the City of New York. If Staten Island is the relevant
political community for decisions concerning the independence and
charter of the new city, then the state has precisely mapped the electorate on the proper jurisdiction. Secession, however, would also involve the subtraction of almost 400,000 people, one-fifth of the land
area, and significant public infrastructure and tax base from New York
City. The relevant jurisdiction, then, could easily be the entire City,
and the State's exclusion of the qualified voters from the other four
boroughs would be subject to strict scrutiny. Even if one believed that
Staten Islanders are more interested in the secession issue and more
directly affected by its outcome than are other New Yorkers, Kramer
suggests that if New York City were deemed to be the relevant jurisdiction the state would have a difficult time demonstrating that Staten Islanders are so much more interested in and affected by secession that
limiting the referendum electorate to them would satisfy the requirement of a precise alignment of the franchise with "interested" or "affected" residents. Thus, whether Staten Island or New York City is the
relevant jurisdiction is crucial for the application of the Kramer analysis.
Two Supreme Court cases suggest that where two local boundaries
may each be used to delimit the electorate for purposes of the application of Equal Protection analysis, the state will be given considerable
discretion in determining which boundary counts even when it operates
to deny some group of affected residents an equally weighted vote, or
any vote at all.
In Town of Lockport v. Citizensfor Community Action at the Local Level,
Inc. ,10o1 the Court considered a challenge to the New York State procedure that enables a county to switch from a traditional "weak county"
government to a "strong county" format, with a new administrative
structure and enhanced regulatory capacity. Such a change requires
the approval in a referendum of concurrent majorities of voters who
live in cities and of those who live outside the cities. A proposed strong
county charter for Niagara County twice won the approval of city voters
and of a majority of all county voters, but both times was rejected by a
majority of the noncity voters and thus failed. The city voters contended that the concurrent majority requirement violated the Equal
Protection Clause. The Supreme Court, however, unanimously
disagreed.
The Lockport Court likened the county reorganization, which
strengthened the county government and weakened other local units,
101. 430 U.S. 259 (1977).
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to "the structural decision to annex or consolidate."1 0 2 A decision to
adopt the "strong county" form of government, like an annexation or a
consolidation, could have a differential impact on the "separate and potentially opposing interests" of city and noncity voters within the
county.1 0 3 The Court assumed that in an annexation proceeding, the
state could recognize that the residents of the annexing city and the
area to be annexed formed different constituencies with different interests since "[t]he fact of impending union alone would not so merge
them into one community of interest as constitutionally to require that
their votes be aggregated in any referendum."' 0 4 Thus, New York
State could require the concurrent approval of the charter change by
different groups of county voters.
Lockport's analogy of the county charter vote to an "impending
union" or a "proposal ... to form a consolidated unit" 10 5 is striking,
since the city and noncity portions of Niagara County had been united
in a single county unit since the beginning of the nineteenth century.
The county charter vote was not an annexation or consolidation. New
territory was not being added to Niagara County; outsiders were not
being subjected to the county's authority. Instead, the county was simply considering an internal reorganization.
Lockport's differentiation of city and noncity voters did not follow
automatically from the Court's traditional respect for residency requirements. Indeed, in the case that first extended the "one person,
one vote" doctrine to the local level, the Court treated the unit of residency for county elections as the county as a whole, rejecting the contention that the different interests urban and rural voters have in
county government could justify giving the latter a greater say in
county elections. 10 6 Moreover, Lockport cannot be read simply as authorizing a supermajority requirement for a decision that has extraordinary significance for a polity. The Court had previously sustained
supermajority requirements, but only on condition that the
supermajority rule not privilege a particular group because of "group
characteristics" such as "geographic location."' 0 7 The concurrent majority requirement in Lockport, however, turned precisely on geographic
08
location.'
102. Id. at 271-73.

103. Id. at 271-72.
104. Id. at 271.
105. Id.
106. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1968).
107. Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 4 (1971) (sustaining 60%o voter approval

requirement as precondition for issuance of bonded indebtedness).
108. Lockport's analysis also focused in part on the fact that the election in question

was a " 'single-shot' referendum." Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action
at the Local Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 266 (1977). In a referendum, unlike the election

of legislators, "the expression of voter will is direct, and there is no need to assure that
the voters' views will be adequately represented through their representatives in the
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The Court's deference to the state's power to determine the territorial scope of the right to vote in elections involving local boundaries
was broadened in Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa.O 9 Holt involved an
Alabama law giving the city of Tuscaloosa "police jurisdiction" over a
three-mile radius outside the city limits without a concomitant extension of the franchise in Tuscaloosa elections to residents of the extraterritorial zone.' 1 0 Citing Kramer, police jurisdiction residents
contended that the denial of the franchise to them could stand only if
justified by a compelling state interest. The Supreme Court, however,
determined that the exclusion of police jurisdiction residents from the
vote in Tuscaloosa elections was not subject to strict scrutiny, and upheld the limitation on the vote.
The Court asserted that judicial protection of the right to vote only
applied to denials of "the franchise to individuals who were physically
resident within the geographic boundaries of the governmental entity
concerned." '1 The police jurisdiction residents were, by definition,
not residents of Tuscaloosa. That police jurisdiction residents were affected by Tuscaloosa's actions did not bolster their claim to vote in
Tuscaloosa elections since "[a] city's decisions inescapably affect individuals living immediately outside its borders" yet "no one would suggest that nonresidents likely to be affected by" municipal action "have a
constitutional right to participate in the political processes bringing it
about." 112 Neither "interest" nor "impact" carries with it the right to
legislature." Id. The "policy impact" of a referendum was also seen as "different in
kind" from the election of representatives-"instead of sending legislators off to the
state capitol to vote on a multitude of issues, the referendum puts one discrete issue to
the voters." Id.
But the Court has subjected restrictions on referenda voting to strict judicial
scrutiny. For example, the Court invalidated limitations on bond issue referenda that
denied the franchise to nontaxpayers. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodzieski, 399 U.S. 204
(1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). Indeed, only two years before
Lockport, the Court invalidated a state law requiring the concurrent approvals of the total
electorate and property taxpayers for the issuance of municipal bonds. See Hill v.
Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975). Although the state had argued that property owners, whose
taxes directly and substantially fund the bond obligation, have a greater stake in the
issuance of bonds than do nonproperty owners, the Court, applying the Kramer test,
found that nonproperty owners were also affected when taxes on rental or commercial
property are passed on in the form of higher prices. See id. at 294-97. "Although the
interests of the two groups are concededly not identical," they were "sufficiently
similar" to prevent the state from distinguishing between them or weighting the
electoral franchise in favor of property taxpayers. Lockport, 430 U.S. at 267-68
(discussing Cipriano, City of Phoenix, and Hill).
109. 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
110. Tuscaloosa's extraterritorial authority included the power to enforce its
municipal police and sanitary ordinances; license businesses, trades, and professions;
and collect license fees equal to one-half that chargeable to similar businesses within the
city's corporate limits. See id. at 61-62.
111. Id. at 68.
112. Id. at 69.
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the franchise in municipal elections for people living outside the city
limits.
Holt's affirmation of the importance of formal political boundaries
in marking the outer limits of the right to vote in municipal'elections
and in avoiding the vagaries and uncertainties of an "all-affected" principle is unexceptionable. But as in Lockport, the Court blithely assumed
away the question of which of two borders-each of which had been
drawn by the state-should count. The residents of the police jurisdiction were not just any group of Tuscaloosa's neighbors seeking a say in
Tuscaloosa's police, tax, land use, or service delivery decisions because
those municipal matters might indirectly affect them. Rather, the state
had drawn a line around the Holt plaintiffs and given Tuscaloosa formal
police and regulatory authority over them. To say that the "allaffected" principle is too open-ended to trigger strict scrutiny of the
disenfranchisement of nonresidents cannot resolve the question of the
voting rights of people resident in a territorially defined area subject to
some degree to direct city control.
To be sure, Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction authority was considerably less than the city's power over residents within the corporate
limits of Tuscaloosa. The city had no power to levy ad valorem taxes,
invoke the power of eminent domain, or zone in the extraterritorial
belt.1 1 3 There were, thus, clear differences in the degree to which
Tuscaloosans and police zone residents were affected by Tuscaloosa's
actions. The limitation of the franchise to Tuscaloosa residents might,
or might not, have been found to be closely tailored to the differential
impact Tuscaloosa's government had on city and police zone residents
under the Kramer test. The limitation on the franchise might have survived strict scrutiny. The Kramer test, however, was never applied.
The Court determined that the Tuscaloosa city limits, and not the
limits of the police zone, were the only relevant border. The Holt opinion never even considered the possibility that the statute establishing
the police jurisdiction might have provided the necessary, formally defined, state-authorized border for evaluating the constitutionality of a
limitation on the franchise.
Lockport and Holt may be read as granting the states broad authority to determine the territorial scope of the right to vote in elections
affecting local boundaries. That is how they have been interpreted by
the lower federal courts1 14 and by the New York state courts in the
secession referendum case in 1990.11-5 Holt's failure to treat the police
113. See id. at 73 n.8.
114. See, e.g., St. Louis County v. City of Town and Country, 590 F. Supp. 731,
737-39 (E.D. Mo. 1984); Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 472-76 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
115. The two lower New York courts were brutally dismissive of the City's
arguments. See City of New York v. State, 556 N.Y.S.2d 823, 828-29 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd,
557 N.Y.S.2d 914, 916-17 (App. Div. 1990). The Court of Appeals was more measured
in its disposition of the case, limiting its holding to a reading of Lockport that the State "is
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jurisdiction as even presenting a discrete local boundary may limit that
decision's persuasive value. 116 Lockport, however, which explicitly discusses the alternative possible definitions of the relevant constituencies, is more closely on point. 1 17 Lockport plainly acknowledges the
state's power to "recognize the realities of... substantially differing
electoral interests" in a local reorganization and to allow the state to
treat the "constituent units" of a local government as relevant jurisdictions for measuring the scope of the franchise.' 1 8 The state's authority
to determine the territorial extent of the secession franchise seems particularly strong in a case, such as the Staten Island secession, in which
the local subunit has both determinate borders and historical existence
as a political unit for at least some local government purposes. Staten
Island is not a fuzzy concept like a neighborhood, or an artificial entity
not prohibited from recognizing the distinctive interests" of Staten Islanders in being
allowed "to express their views" in what the court treated as a nonbinding, advisory
vote. City of New York v. State, 562 N.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1990).
116. Holt spoke of the state's authority to limit the franchise within the "geographic
boundaries of the governmental entity concerned," 439 U.S. at 68, and plainly equated
"governmental entity" with "city" or "municipality." The police jurisdiction, despite its
fixed borders and the specified powers of Tuscaloosa within it, was not an organized
government and therefore not a "entity" for voting boundary purposes. Professor
Michelman has seen in this aspect of Holt a basis for finding that the Court may hold a
"constitutive understanding" of voting rights and a possible justification for Holtwhich he would find otherwise indefensible on an "instrumental understanding" of
voting rights as enfranchising all interested or affected persons "residentially anchored"
to the city and "within range of a substantial battery of city regulatory powers."
Michelman, supra note 94, at 478. In his reading, "'[c]ity' would.. signify something
qualitative about the attitudes of members [of the community] toward each other or
toward their common enterprise of government." Id. at 479. That attitude would be
"signified and made by moving into the community's well-defined corporate space." Id.
On such a constitutive understanding of political participation, "one cannot remain
aloof from the process, hover around its edges, and claim the status of a franchise
member." Id.
It is difficult to see how this rationale justifies Holt (and even Professor Michelman
indicates that he disagrees with the decision, see id. at 485). The residents of the police
jurisdiction were not half-hearted putative citizens uncertain whether to commit to
Tuscaloosa, but simply neighbors of the city who sought the franchise only because they
were subject to direct regulation by the city even though neither they nor their property
were physically present in the city. They might have preferred to "hover around its
edges," but they were not allowed to remain "aloof from the process" because of the
state legislature's action creating the police jurisdiction. Id. at 479.
Nevertheless, it could be argued that Holt is limited to situations involving a "welldefined corporate space;" and since in the secession case the only "corporate space" is
New York City, Holt cannot save a voting rule that excludes the residents of the other
four boroughs from the referendum franchise. Even on this reading of Holt, the state
may argue that Staten Island is also a "well-defined" space which, if not literally
corporate, has physical integrity, is a functioning governmental entity, and is more than
a mere unorganized zone.
117. Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level, Inc.,
430 U.S. 259, 268-72 (1977).
118. Id. at 272.
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like an extraterritorial zone, but is instead a geographically certain area
that has been a county of the state for three centuries.
The Staten Island secession differs from the county reorganization
in Lockport in one important way. Although the Court's analogy of the
Niagara County charter change to an "impending union" or merger of
hitherto separate areas is questionable, the Lockport analysis focused on
annexations and consolidations-reorganizations joining together territories that had previously been under distinct governments. Lockport's approach is thus consistent with the validation of state policies
that protect local autonomy by taking existing local governments as the
status quo and immunizing them from fundamental alteration or dissolution without their consent.
In the secession setting, by contrast, the fundamental alteration is
the detachment of a part of the city from the whole; the existing city
government is the status quo. If, as the Lockport Court put it, "the fact
of impending union alone would not so merge [an annexing city and
the area to be annexed] into one community of interest as constitutionally to require that their votes be aggregated in any referendum to approve annexation,"'1 19 then the fact of impending secession does not
yet divide New York City into two communities of interest as to justify
constitutionally the limitation of the franchise in the secession referendum to the seceding area.
This was the position of the California Supreme Court in a case
involving the secession of a school district from a larger unified school
district. The California Court held, Holt and Lockport notwithstanding,
that the limitation of the referendum vote to residents of the seceding
area was subject to strict scrutiny, and that since secession had an impact on the well-being of the district as a whole, equal protection required that voters from the entire unified school district be allowed to
participate in the secession referendum. 120 Thus, New York City's litigators might be able to generate a tenable argument that the City's
boundaries are the relevant jurisdictional lines for determining the referendum electorate by asserting that the consolidated City is the status
quo, which Lockport indicates ought to be privileged in the case of a
12 1
proposed boundary change.
119. Id. at 271.
120. See FullertonJoint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 654 P.2d 168
(Cal. 1982). But cf. Citizens Against Forced Annexation v. Local Agency Formation
Comm'n, 654 P.2d 193 (Cal. 1982) (sustaining state law limiting franchise in annexation
elections to residents of territory to be annexed, when limitation furthered compelling
state interest in facilitating annexations). On any theory of voting rights, Citizens is
difficult to reconcile with Fullerton, decided the same day. See 654 P.2d at 188 n.1, 193

(opinion of Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting in Fullerton). The two cases are
transparently outcome-driven, with the Court blocking the secession of a white area
from a somewhat more racially heterogeneous school district in Fullerton, and facilitating

the attachment of a moderate income area to a very affluent one in Citizens.
121. New York City's litigators have, of course, already lost their challenge to the
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But a fairer reading of Lockport and Holt is that the Supreme Court
considers the entire issue of local boundary-drawing, with its attendant
impact on the scope of the right to vote, to be a matter for the political
judgment of state legislatures without federal constitutional limitation
or guidance. The very failure to address the boundary question candidly underscores just how much the Court is willing to leave local
boundaries to arbitrary state action. Both Lockport and Holt expressly
invoked Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh122 and its traditional doctrine that the
states have "absolute discretion" over municipalities, including the
power to "expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a
part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the
corporation . . . with or without the consent of the citizens, or even
against their protest."' 23 Hunter specifically approved the consolidation of a smaller city into a larger one, despite the contention of the
smaller city's residents that the consolidation referendum failed to provide for the separate approvals of the voters of the two cities. The
Court's concern in Hunter was to underscore state authority to set and
remake local boundaries, not to protect the local status quo.
Although, as Kramer indicates, the state's discretion is subject to
strict review when the state chooses to allow some, but not all, local
citizens to participate in a decision concerning the organization of local
government, Lockport and Holt return to the states the discretion to
choose the territorial boundary lines within which the distribution of
the franchise will be subject to strict scrutiny. The determination of the
proper unit for local self-government, then, is a matter for state legislatures rather than federal constitutional review. As long as the state
does not violate a specific constitutional or statutory demand, such as
the ban on invidious racial discrimination, 124 the definition of local
boundaries is an issue for political resolution, rather than principled
judicial analysis.
C. Politics and Law in the Definition of the Secession Electorate
The Court's reluctance to review state boundary determinations
even when the right to vote is at stake is certainly excusable, and possibly justifiable. The current constitutional protection of the right to
vote derives from our commitment to a political system based on democratic self-government, 125 but the concept of self-government says
nothing about who is the "self" that does the governing.' 26 There is
1990 referendum, but the issue will certainly recur when the Staten Island Charter
Commission submits its handiwork for referendum approval in 1993 or 1994.
122. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
123. Id. at 178-79.
124. See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 467 (1987);
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960).
125. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
126. See Whelan, supra note 99, at 15-16.
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no generally accepted standard for determining what makes a group of
people both a discrete group (and not a collection of distinct groups)
and a group distinct from other groups. 12 7 Thus at the international
level, "the theory of nationalism lacks precise and universally valid criteria for identifying a genuine nation." 12 8 Similarly, at the local level
there is no theory for determining when one local polity ought to end
and another begin.
Our political tradition 12 9 is built on territorially based communities. Indeed, as other methods of delimiting the polity-by rank, by
wealth, by race, by gender-have fallen away over time, 130 the territorial definition of our polities stands out in ever sharper relief. Within a
given territorial jurisdiction, the "all-affected" or "all-interested" principle invoked in Kramer holds sway, extending the franchise to virtually
all adult citizens.' 3 ' The elimination of most other qualifications for
the franchise has, if anything, heightened the significance of residence
within the territory. Our representatives to national, state, and, increasingly, local legislatures are elected from territorial districts.' 3 2 Indeed, our entire system of local self-government rests on membership
127. Although the United Nations Charter and other international agreements
recognize the principle of self-determination of peoples, in the absence of any generally
accepted rule for recognizing a "people," that principle has had little impact outside the
setting of decolonization. See Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of SelfDetermination 16-20 (1978). Ethnic self-determination is a particularly troublesome
concept, with the criteria for marking off one ethnic group from another highly
debatable, see Buchanan, supra note 24, at 48-52, and claims for ethnic selfdetermination often a product of specific economic or territorial grievances rather than
a history of ethnic self-consciousness, see Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination
39-98 (1979).
128. Whelan, supra note 99, at 32.
129. To say that territorial polities are a part of our political tradition is not to say
they are logically inevitable-other forms of political organization, such as occupation or
social group, are available-but rather that they are the product of our history and
reflect our rejection of other, more narrowing modes of political organization.
130. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV; Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (holding poll tax unconstitutional).
131. The major exception is for persons who have been convicted of a felony. See
Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). Persons adjudged mentally incompetent
may also be denied the franchise. See Manhattan State Citizens' Group, Inc. v. Bass,
524 F. Supp. 1270, 1274-75 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The limitation of the franchise to citizens, and the consequent exclusion of adult
resident aliens, raises political as well as territorial questions about the definition of a
community that are beyond the scope of this article. Compare Gerald M. Rosberg,
Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1092,
1110-15 (1977) (outlining case for allowing aliens to vote) with Sanford Levinson,
Suffrage and Community: Who Should Vote?, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 545, 553-58 (1989)
(arguing that "[flor the resident alien, the combination of permanent residence and
overwhelming interest is not enough to warrant the ballot").
132. For an argument that democratic representation in contemporary society
requires the election of representatives from territorial subunits, see Nancy L. Schwartz,
The Blue Guitar: Political Representation and Community (1988).

COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 92:775

in territorially defined units.13 3 Boundaries alone mark off the scope of
the arena for local self-determination and define who are the governed
whose consent must be sought.
However, when the boundaries are themselves the issue to be decided, there is no uncontestably "democratic" way of deciding who
makes the decision. There is no general theoretical basis for drawing
territorial boundary lines, or determining whether to place a particular
for its residents-within a particular
territory-and with it the franchise
34
politically salient boundary.'
The claims of New York City and of Staten Island that the City or
the borough respectively is the appropriate jurisdiction for determining
the referendum electorate, reduce to political arguments about which
interest-the preservation of the consolidated City or borough independence-is to be favored. The two most plausible legal standardspreference for the status quo or deference to the political judgment of
the state-are both arbitrary. In Lockport and Holt, preference for the
status quo and deference to positive law yielded the same outcomes.13 5
In the case of Staten Island, however, the two principles would lead to
opposite results. New York City is the existing local territorial government, so that privileging the status quo would require treating the City
as the relevant voting jurisdiction. By contrast, deference to the state
would allow restriction of the referendum electorate to Staten Island
residents.
The determination of which principle to follow may have important implications for the political organization of metropolitan areas.
In the Staten Island case, deferring to the state would facilitate the fragmentation of a metropolitan government, while privileging the status
quo would prevent such an outcome. But in most cases of local boundary change and government reorganization the effects would be the reverse. Given the already extensive fragmentation of most metropolitan
areas, privileging the status quo would tend to protect the independence of large numbers of independent suburban municipalities, since
it would require'the separate consent of each local electorate to consolidation proposals or regional government plans. Deference to the
state, however, would at least leave open the possibility of state action
to redraw local boundaries and reorganize metropolitan areas. The decision whether to promote or limit suburban independence is one that
should be made at the state level, where the implications for all the
133. Some local units, such as special districts, are both functionally and
territorially defined. General purpose local governments-counties, cities, and other
municipal corporations-are purely territorial.
134. See C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican
Politics, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 491, 497-502 (1989).
135. This argument accepts the Lockport Court's position that functionally the
county reorganization was like an annexation or merger of two distinct units. An equally
plausible reading was that the status quo consisted of one integral county.
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affected localities and for the region as a whole can be considered,
rather than through a voting rule that requires the consent of each locality and would allow parochial local self-interest to determine the regional fate.' 3 6 State determination would avoid the entrenchment of
metropolitan fragmentation that would result from treating each existing local unit as entitled to separate electoral participation in any ref1 37
erendum on regional reorganization.
Thus, deference to the state may be both an excusable response to
the lack of any "democratic" legal standard for deciding the territorial
scope of the vote and a justifiable alternative to an automatic preference for existing local boundaries. It is also consistent with the traditional jurisprudence of federalism that would leave state-local issues to
the states.
There is one possible argument against the limitation of the referendum to Staten Islanders that would preserve general deference to
state authority to determine boundaries while also protecting the right
to vote against boundary-line decisions that reflect constitutionally proscribed motivations. 138 In defending the legislature's action, many
Staten Islanders have asserted that allowing the whole City to vote
would mean that Staten Islanders would be "swamped" or "overwhelmed" by the rest of the City.13 9 This claim assumes that Staten
Islanders and other New Yorkers will vote differently on the question,
and that the other New Yorkers must be excluded because they will be
hostile, or at least indifferent, to Staten Island's aspiration to autonomy. The Supreme Court, however, has repeatedly rejected limitations
on the franchise intended to favor one point of view or to influence the
136. A fuller discussion of whether metropolitan governance is better served by
fragmentation or regional organization is reserved for Part IV, infra.
137. This argument for state determination of the properjurisdiction for allocation
of the franchise in a local reorganization referendum reflects a belief in the desirability
of state power to reconsider fragmentation. Admittedly, a preference for state power
could result in state definitions of secession electorates that would facilitate secession,
much as state voting rules have often facilitated the incorporation of outlying areas into
independent municipalities and have hindered the ability of cities to expand through
annexation. See Our Localism I, supra note 90, at 73-81.
Nonetheless, permitting the states to set the territorial basis for a local
reorganization vote is preferable to either of the two principal alternatives: (i) a voting
rule predicated on existing local boundaries, which would favor a fragmented status quo
over the possibility of structural change; or (ii) tailoring the voting rights analysis to the
facts of each case, as the California Supreme Court appears to have done in its Fullerton
and Citizens decisions, in order to avoid local fragmentation and promote consolidation
in each election. See supra note 120. The Fullerton/Citizenscase-specific outcome-driven
approach makes a mockery of the notion of a constitutionally protected right to vote.
138. Cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (state's power to fix municipal
boundaries limited by Fifteenth Amendment's protection of citizens from deprivation of
franchise on account of race).
139. See, e.g., Regina Paleau, Island in the Sun, N.Y. Newsday, Oct. 10, 1990, at
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outcome of an election. 140
In Dunn v. Blumstein,14 1 for example, the Court summarily dismissed the argument that some durational residency requirement was
necessary "to impress upon [local] voters the local viewpoint."' 42 Similarly, in Carringtonv. Rash,' 4 3 in response to the argument of the state
of Texas that military personnel newly moved into the Lone Star State
might not have local interests sufficiently in mind, and therefore could
be excluded from voting in state elections, the Court found that such
"'[fiencing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because
of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible."' 44 In sustaining the concurrent majority rule in Lockport, the Court noted that
there was "no indication" the requirement "work[ed] to favor" noncity
voters over city voters. Despite the outcome in Niagara County, there
are other counties where noncity voters outnumber city voters; 14 5 in
those counties the concurrent majority rule would benefit city voters.
By contrast, the Staten Island secession vote limitation clearly favors
46
one group of voters-and one outcome.'
In the end, though, this argument dissolves into the prior one concerning the definition of the proper unit for measuring the allocation of
the franchise. While the state may not limit the franchise to promote a
point of view, surely the state may limit the franchise to residents of a
jurisdiction to assure that the views of the residents prevail in local elections and are not swamped by outsiders. Carringtonand Dunn are not to
the contrary, since both involved denials of the franchise to residents
within a jurisdiction. Although Lockport complicates this analysis, the
Court in that case did not condition its approval of the concurrent majority rule on the lack of favoritism for one group of local units. Implicit in the Court's discussion of annexation elections is an acceptance
of the state's authority to structure the vote to enable residents of areas
to be annexed to veto annexation.
The federal constitutional protection of the right to vote, then,
leaves the determination of the proper unit for local self-government to
the political processes of the states. 14 7 Although the lack of reasoned
140. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555-56 (1964); Michelman, supra
note 94, at 470-72.
141. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).

142. Id. at 354-55.
143. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
144. Id. at 94.
145. See Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local Level,
Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 272 n.18 (1977).
146. Although there is no certainty that New York City voters will vote against
secession, or that Staten Islanders will favor it, that has certainly been the assumption of
the political actors involved in the dispute.

147. There is one other federal voting rights issue. Under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988), voting qualifications, standards, practices, or

procedures are unlawful if they have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote
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elaboration in the right to vote cases is disconcerting, it may be due to
the intractability of the problem as well as to a substantive value of federalism to leave the matter to the states. Legal standards, if any, for
scrutinizing the procedure for the secession of one locality from another are primarily a matter of state, not federal, constitutional law, and
involve an analysis of the meaning and scope of state constitutional
protection of local home rule.
III.

SECESSION AND THE STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION

OF LOCAL HOME RULE

A. The Indeterminacy of Home Rule Doctrine
Most state constitutions contain a "home rule" article or amendment that provides some protection for the structural integrity of local
governments and grants them some power to act with respect to local
matters. 148 Home rule emerged in the late nineteenth century, at a
time of considerable state-local tensions. One notorious abuse of the
period was the practice by rural-dominated state legislatures of adopting "ripper bills"--laws that wrested municipal functions out of urban

hands and transferred them to state appointees. 149 Home rule was inon account of race or other proscribed criteria. Local government territorial
reorganizations, such as annexations, have been treated as actions with the potential for
denying or abridging the right to vote, and as such may be challenged under the Act.
See, e.g., City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S 462 (1987); City of Richmond
v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
Moreover, under § 5 of the Act voting rule changes affecting covered jurisdictions must
be precleared by the Department ofJustice before they may take effect or be approved
by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(1988). Bronx, Kings and New York Counties are covered jurisdictions, see 28 C.F.R.
§ 51, app. (1991), and the secession of Staten Island would have some effect on the
voting rights of the residents of those counties who are protected by the Act. The
secession of Staten Island would probably have to be precleared; but since this secession
would increase the relative voting strength in New York City municipal elections of the
minority residents of the three covered jurisdictions, see infra text accompanying note
255, § 5 of the Act ought not to be an obstacle to secession. Whether § 2 will prove to
be a barrier is likely to turn on the provisions of the Staten Island Charter and the
structure of the local legislature it creates, rather than on the fact of secession itself.
Even if the constitutional protection of the right to vote were held to sustain the
claim of the residents of the other four boroughs to participate in the Staten Island
secession referendum, the state could avoid the City's participation in the process,
without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause, by eliminating the referendum
requirement and directly authorizing the secession. There is no constitutional right to
vote on local territorial reorganizations. See, e.g., Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d
287, 290 (6th Cir. 1984) (no right to vote concerning detachment of territory from one
jurisdiction and annexation to another); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422, 424 (4th Cir.
1978) (no right to vote on annexation).
148. See Melvin B. Hill, Jr., State Laws Governing Local Government Structure and
Administration 43 (1978) (home rule granted to cities in 41 states and to counties in 27
states).
149. See generally Howard L. McBain, The Law and Practice of Municipal Home
Rule 1916-1930, at 5-12 (1933) (reviewing numerous instances of legislative
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tended to change the traditional rule of plenary state legislative authority over local matters, to protect'cities from opportunistic, partisan state
meddling, and thus to vindicate the principle of local self-government.
New York first added a home rule provision to its constitution in
1894.150 Several times amended in this century, the home rule article
still offers a measure of protection against state interference with local
autonomy. Currently, Article IX of the state constitution provides that
the legislature has power to act "in relation to the property, affairs or
government of any local government only by general law, or by special
law only ... on request of two-thirds of the total membership of [the
locality's] legislative body or on the request of its chief executive officer
concurred in by a majority of such membership."' 5 1 The restriction on
"special laws" reflects the article's genesis in the nineteenth century
concern with "ripper" legislation and other targeted state interventions
in local affairs, while also preserving the state's authority to act generally with respect to local matters.
Even though this protection of local autonomy is narrow, at first
glance it would appear to apply here. The Staten Island secession law
is plainly a special law. It affects only one city and is written expressly
in terms of Staten Island, and not for any class of municipalities. In
adopting the secession measure, the legislature acted without a request-a so-called "home rule message"-from either the Mayor of
New York City or two-thirds of the New York City Council. As a matter
of ordinary understanding, moreover, the subtraction of one-fifth of
New York City's territory and 379,000 people, the potential loss of millions of dollars of public improvements, tax base, and valuable land for
future development, and the alteration of the City's political structure1 5 2 and socio-economic mix plainly and directly relate to the "prop"interference" with cities and the protests thus aroused). For instances of state ripper
bills, see People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871) (state law transferring
control over Detroit's water works and sewers from city to state board); People ex rel.
Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. 532 (1857) (state law transferring New York City and Brooklyn
police forces to a state-controlled metropolitan police district). See generally Jon
Teaford, City Versus State: The Struggle for Legal Ascendancy, 17 Am. J. Legal Hist.
51 (1973) (historical review of home rule disputes).
150. The consolidation of Greater New York entailed submission of the
consolidation bill and the city charter bill to the mayors of the cities affected, pursuant to
the provision of the 1894 Constitution authorizing mayoral review and veto of special
laws affecting "property, affairs, or government" of a city. The 1894 provision allowed
the legislature to override a mayoral veto by simple majorities in each legislative house;
hence it has been referred to as a "suspensive" veto. See supra notes 33-38 and
accompanying text.
151. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b)(2). The New York Constitution provides a second
exception to the ban on special laws relating to the "property, affairs or government" of
a local government. The legislature may adopt such a law on a "certificate of necessity"
from the governor and with the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses of the
legislature. However, this exception is not available in the case of special laws affecting
New York City. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2(b)(2)(b).
152. Staten Island's three representatives would leave the City Council and the
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erty, affairs or government" of the City.
A "plain meaning" reading of the state constitution, then, strongly
supports a claim that the secession statute is unconstitutional. But in
New York, as in most states, the courts have rarely provided as much
scope to home rule as the text of the state constitution would suggest.
As the Court of Appeals stated in Adler v. Deegan,15 3 New York's leading
home rule case, "many words have a meaning at law different from that
of common speech."1 5 4 The court has long adhered to the view that
the constitutional text does not limit the power of the legislature to act
by special law with respect to matters of "state concern" even if such a
law affects local property, affairs, or government. Nor does the determination of whether "state concern" or home rule applies turn on the
relative balance of state or local interests. As ChiefJudge Cardozo put
it in Adler more than sixty years ago, "predominance is not the test" as
it "involves comparisons too vague and too variable, too much a matter
of mere opinion, to serve as an objective standard." 15 5 The only "objective standard" is to allow the state to legislate by special law "if the
subject be in a substantial degree a matter of State concern... though
1 56
intermingled with it are concerns of the locality."
Thus, for the New York courts the question of whether the state
legislature could authorize Staten Island's secession without the City's
consent turns not on whether secession affects New York City's "property, affairs or government," but on whether secession is a matter of
state concern.
1. Secession as a Matter of "State Concern."
In City of New York v.
Village of Lawrence,157 the Court of Appeals treated a municipal boundary change as a matter of state concern. The court held that although
"annexation or disconnection" of a city's territory "does in greater or
lesser degree affect the property, affairs or government of [a] city,"' 158
the "property, affairs or government" language in the home rule article
did not limit the legislature's power to act by special law, adopted without a home rule message, to transfer territory from the City of New
York to the adjacent Village of Lawrence.' 5 9 The court interpreted the
-

appointees of its borough president would no longer sit on the City Planning
Commission, which would alter the citywide-borough balance on the Commission.
153. 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929).
154. Id. at 706.
155. Id. at 713 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 713-14.
157. 165 N.E. 836 (N.Y. 1929).
158. Id. at 841.
159. Lawrence involved the interpretation of the home rule article of the
constitution of 1894 (as amended in 1923), see supra text accompanying notes 32-34.
The 1923 amendment broadened the scope of home rule protection to include "any law
relating to the property, affairs or government of cities, which shall be special or local
either in its terms or in its effect," N.Y. Const. of 1924, art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added), in
order to overcome case law which had embraced "the fiction that a law was not local so
long as it was disguised to look general." W. Bernard Richland, Constitutional City
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home rule language to refer only to "the internal affairs of a city or the
functions of its officers" and not to matters affecting "the welfare of the
general public as well as the residents of a city.' 60 The creation of
cities and the definition of their boundaries had traditionally been a
matter of state power. The home rule amendment was held not to have
disturbed the state's authority in this area even if "as a necessary incident the action by the Legislature may in some degree affect the property, affairs or government of a city.'

61

Lawrence, however, grew out of circumstances very different from
the proposed Staten Island secession, and portions of the Lawrence
opinion seemed sensitive to the particular facts of that case. Lawrence
involved a boundary dispute between two existing incorporated
municipalities; it is difficult to see how such an interlocal conflict could
be resolved other than by state law. Moreover, the state legislation involved only a minor alteration of New York City's territory-the detachment of a strip of land less than one square mile, substantially
unoccupied, and without any public infrastructure. "Under such circumstances," in which "the effect upon the city is confined to a slight
diminution of [its] territory," the legislature retained its power to alter
municipal boundaries by special law. 162
The court indicated that in other cases
the effect of a change of the boundaries of a city upon its property, affairs, or government might be very serious. Disconnection of territory might render the existing form of government
of a city inappropriate to meet the needs of its altered boundaries. It might place outside of the altered boundaries property
163
of the city of substantial value.
The court declined to pass on such a situation other than to leave open
the possibility that it might "weigh opposing considerations and classify
according to the substantial effect of the statute."6 4
Lawrence's potential openness to balancing was transformed by
Adler v. Deegan,' 65 decided just a few months later, into a categorical
ruling "that a change in boundary by the Legislature was not a law comHome Rule in New York, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 311, 327 (1954). The 1923 amendment
eliminated the mayoral suspensive veto, but provided instead that a special law relating
to the property, affairs, or government of cities could be adopted only on a declaration
of emergency by the Governor and on approval by two-thirds of each house of the
legislature-"a requirement, far more stringent than the simple majority formerly
needed to override the mayor's veto." Id.
160. Lawrence, 165 N.E. at 840.
161. Id. at 841. Cf. People ex rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 101 N.E. 442, 450-51 (N.Y.
1913) (upholding state legislation that provided for the detachment of Bronx County
from New York County).
162. Lawrence, 165 N.E. at 841.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929).
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ing within the home rule provisions."' 66 Adler concerned a state law
dealing with living conditions in New York City's apartment houses. As
one critic of the decision later noted, "the law was both salutary and
badly needed,"' 16 7 but it was a special law relating to just one city and it
had been enacted over the opposition of the city's government. To
save the housing reform, the court interpreted the home rule article as
placing little restriction on the legislature's exercise of its traditional
police powers. In so doing, it recharacterized earlier home rule cases in
a manner consistent with the broadest possible reading of state
16 8
authority.
Thus, Lawrence was unmoored from its particular facts: "The degree of the [boundary] change, or its importance, could not and did not
affect the principle. It either was or was not a law touching the property and government of the city, and we held that it was not."' 16 9 The
balancing of the relative weights of the respective state and local interests that Lawrence appeared to undertake was ruled out both in the principal Adler opinion, which first articulated the sweeping "state concern"
doctrine, and in ChiefJudge Cardozo's dismissal of a "predominance"
test in his concurrence.
Adler and the doctrine of "state concern" drastically curtailed the
immunity that home rule might have provided local governments from
state interference. 170 Subsequent decisions have treated Adler as a "decisively enlightening case,"' 7 1 and have relied upon it to sustain state
laws having a direct effect on basic local interests as long as the law
could be linked to some matter of state concern. 172 The two lower
courts in the Staten Island secession referendum case treated Adler, and
Lawrence as interpreted by Adler, as requiring the dismissal of the City's
i7 3
home rule claim.
166. Id. at 707.
167. Richland, supra note 159, at 329.

168. See id. at 329-32.
169. Adler, 167 N.E. at 707 (characterizing Lawrence holding).
170. See James D. Cole, Constitutional Home Rule in New York: "The Ghost of

Home Rule," 59 St.John's L. Rev. 713, 716-18 (1985);J.D. Hyman, Home Rule in New
York 1941-1965: Retrospect and Prospect, 15 Buff. L. Rev. 335, 343-45 (1965);

Richland, supra note 159, at 331; Note, Home Rule and the New York Constitution, 66
Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1149-51 (1966). Home rule as the authority of local governments

to initiate local legislation has fared somewhat better in New York. See F.J. Macchiarola,
Local Government Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48J. Urb. L. 335, 357-58 (1971).

171. See, e.g., Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 362 N.E.2d 581, 584 (N.Y. 1977).
172. See, e.g., Town of Islip v. Cuomo, 473 N.E.2d 756, 759-61 (N.Y. 1984)
(municipal property used as landfill); Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New York,
405 N.E.2d 679, 680 (N.Y. 1980) (local civil servants); Board of Educ. v. City of New
York, 362 N.E.2d 948, 954 (N.Y. 1977) (percentage of local budget devoted to

education).
173. City of New York v. State, 556 N.Y.S.2d 823, 826-28 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 557
N.Y.S.2d 914, 916 (App. Div. 1990). The trial court also placed some weight on article
X, § 1 of the state constitution, which bans the creation of corporations by special law

but exempts municipal corporations from that ban. Id. at 827-28. Although this article
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New York courts are not alone in applying a "state concern" doctrine to affirm the authority of state legislatures to displace local autonomy, home rule notwithstanding. 174 State courts in general are
reluctant to restrict the state's legislative powers to act, even in the face
of home rule claims. Thus, "the class of problems considered local has
become progressively narrower over time." 1 7 5 Most state courts treat
municipal boundaries as interlocal matters, outside the scope of home
rule immunity. It is hornbook law that a state has plenary authority
over municipal boundaries: In general, states have the power to provide for the detachment or excision of a part of the municipality's territory, with or without the consent of the municipality or its
inhabitants.' 76 State laws providing for the detachment of municipal
territory have been sustained in the face of objections that they violate
17 7
home rule or state constitutional prohibitions against special laws.
Some state courts have analogized secession or detachment to annexation, emphasizing that since both have extralocal effects neither
falls within the immunity for municipal "internal affairs" provided by
home rule. As the Ohio Supreme Court explained, detachment has extraterritorial effects because the people and territory detached from a
municipality either are placed in another municipality or create an entirely new one. Thus, detachment is not "purely local in nature," but
extends beyond local borders and therefore is a matter for state determination.' 78 Other courts have not sought to justify the rule, but
rather have simply treated it as axiomatic that boundaries, including
would sustain the incorporation of Staten Island by special law after secession, it is difficult
to see how this fact answers New York City's argument that the actual detachment of
Staten Island's territory from New York City by special law is unconstitutional.
174. See, e.g., Gordon L. Clark, Judges and the Cities: Interpreting Local
Autonomy 113-14 (1985); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 1057, 1116-17 (1980); Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under
Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 652 (1964). For a particularly
thoughtful discussion, see City of LaGrande v. Public Employees Retirement Bd., 576
P.2d 1204, 1210-15 (Or. 1978).
175. Clark, supra note 174, at 113; see also Michael E. Libonati, Reconstructing
Local Government, 19 Urb. Law. 645, 646 (1987) ("[State courts] adopt a progressively
constricted view of what is a purely local matter and an expansive notion of matters
which are of statewide concern.").
176. See, e.g., 1 ChesterJ. Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law § 1B.01 (1991); 2
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 7.24 (3d ed. 1988); C. Dallas
Sands & Michael E. Libonati, Local Government Law § 8.31 (1991).
177. 2 McQuillin, supra note 176, at § 7.26; Sands & Libonati, supra note 176, at
§ 8.31.
178. Village of Beechwood v. Board of Elections, 148 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ohio
1958). One leading commentator agrees that detachment is like annexation, that as a
result it also constitutes an assertion of extraterritorial power (albeit one that is "less
obvious"), and, thus, that it is beyond the scope of home rule. See Sandalow, supra note
174, at 694 n.199.
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detachments, are an area of plenary legislative authority.17 9
Lawrence (particularly as reinterpreted by Adler), the long line of
precedents it has spawned expounding and applying the doctrine of
state concern, and the general treatise and case law assumption of
broad state authority over municipal boundary questions, thus, would
appear to dispose of the home rule question and vindicate the state's
right to grant Staten Island autonomy by special law without the consent of New York City.
Yet it is not that easy, and the state's position may not even be
right.
2. Secession as a Matter of "Local Concern."
The "state concern"
doctrine and the cases establishing home rule's limited scope fail to
capture the import, both symbolic and real, of a state law authorizing
secession without the City's participation or consent. From New York
City's perspective, few laws could more effectively evoke the specter of
the nineteenth century state legislative interventions in municipal affairs that provided the initial impetus for home rule than this one. By
shearing off one of the City's five constituent elements, the Staten
Island secession legislation is a startling reminder of the "ripper"
laws-and of the intense, often highly partisan state-local struggles of
the past. The contrast between the effect of this law and the purpose of
state constitutional home rule to protect the structural integrity of local
governments from state interference is too stark to be easily ignored,
even given Adler's admonition to ignore the "colloquial significance" of
80
words and to attend to their "special, legal significance."'
Indeed, to treat the separation of Staten Island from New York
City as outside the scope of New York City's "property, affairs or government" is actually to give those words a narrower meaning than they
held a century ago. Proponents of the state's authority to effectuate
secession have noted that Greater New York is a product of state legislation, and that the consolidation legislation was enacted over the opposition of the City of New York. They argue, in effect, that what the
legislature put together the legislature may put asunder.'18 These proponents, however, confuse the limited procedural protection cities received under the home rule article of 1894 with the broader substantive
understanding of the meaning of municipal "property, affairs or government" expressed in the actions of the legislature that consolidated
Greater New York.
In the 1890s, the state legislature submitted both the special law
providing for the consolidation of Greater New York and the proposed
New York City charter to the mayors of the affected cities for their ap-

179. See, e.g., Kel-Kan Inv. Corp. v. Village of Greenwood, 428 So. 2d 401,405-06
(La. 1983); State ex rel. Andersen v. Leahy, 199 N.W.2d 713, 714-15 (Neb. 1972).
180. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 706 (N.Y. 1929).
181. See, e.g., Remedies of a Proud Outcast, supra note 54, at 19; Williamj. Burke,
The Legality of Staten Island Secession, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 5, 1991, at 1.
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proval. The 1894 constitution gave cities only a "suspensive," rather
than an absolute, veto over special laws relating to municipal "property, affairs or government," so that if local consent were refused, the
legislature could still enact special state legislation by repassing itwhich was, in fact, how consolidation and the charter became law.
However, there was no question in 1896 that consolidation was within
the home rule provision of the state constitution.
The current home rule provision of the state constitution provides
localities with stronger protections against special state laws found to
relate to local "property, affairs or government." The current provision would permit New York City to bar what in 1896 it could only
delay. Neither the history nor the text of the state constitution indicates that municipal "property, affairs or government" should be read
more narrowly than it was in 1896. If anything, home rule should have
a broader meaning now than at the end of the nineteenth century.
During the course of the twentieth century, many states repeatedly
revised their constitutions to expand home rule protections. These
constitutional changes responded to increased public commitment to
local self-government. They also represented efforts to outflank the
"state concern" doctrine and restrictive judicial interpretations of earlier home rule provisions. Relatively narrow notions of the proper
scope of local action in the early years of this century have been replaced by a broader acceptance of, and indeed more forceful calls for,
local autonomy. New York, for example, amended its home rule constitutional amendment, which was first adopted in 1894, in 1923, in 1938,
and most significantly in 1964. Currently, the home rule article declares that "[e]ffective local self-government" is a "purpose[ ]" of the
182
people of the state, includes a bill of rights for local governments,
and adopts a rule of liberal construction for "rights, powers, privileges,
and immunities" granted to local governments under the state constitution.' 8 3 Although the more specific provisions of these amendments
tend to widen local initiative to act without state legislative authorization, rather than to strengthen local immunity from state legislative interference, 8 4 the intent to enhance the position of local governments
generally relative to the state is evident.
The 1964 amendment altered the legislature's traditionally plenary
authority over municipal boundary changes. Section 1(d) of the Home
Rule Article specifically addresses the question of municipal annexations. It provides that no annexation may occur without the consent, by
referendum, of the people in the area to be annexed, as well as the
consent of the governing board "of each local government, the area of
which is affected.., upon the basis of a determination that the annexa182. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 1.
183. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 3(c).
184. Here and elsewhere in this article I have borrowed the "initiative/immunity"
dichotomy from Clark, supra note 174, at 7.
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tion is in the over-all public interest."1 8 5 This requirement of multiple
consents for annexation is consistent with the annexation rules in many
states, although only rarely have the requirements been placed in a
state constitution.
The 1964 amendment, thus, constitutionalizes an aspect of local
boundaries, and it does so in a manner clearly intended to protect existing boundaries from alteration by the state without the consent of
the affected localities.1 86 Taking the amendment in combination with
the other extensions of the scope of home rule, it could be argued that
local boundaries are no longer a matter of "state concern," but instead
should be protected as an aspect of local "property, affairs or government." Given the analogy some courts and commentators have drawn
between annexation and detachment, section 1 (d) could be extended to
secession cases and construed to require the consent of the governing
board of the locality from which separation is sought.
This reading of the annexation provision for its spirit, however,
plainly goes beyond its letter. There is no express constitutional limitation on other forms of boundary alteration, such as consolidation, dissolution, or detachment of territory. Indeed, since section l(d) is
limited to annexation and does not address local boundaries generally,
it could be interpreted as ratifying the traditional judicial treatment of
all other aspects of local boundaries as matters of state concern subject
to the plenary authority of the legislature. Although it may seem odd to
provide a city with greater protection against the forcible annexation to
it of unwanted new territory than against the forcible detachment from
it of existing and wanted territory, that is the line indicated by the text
of the state constitution.
Even without attempting to fit secession within the letter of section
1 (d), it may be argued that although boundary disputes generally have
an interlocal dimension, and are thus outside of home rule and a fit
subject for state legislative resolution,18 7 the Staten Island secession is
not such an interlocal dispute. Many of the courts and commentators
that assimilated secession to the general category of border changes
and treated them all as matters for state determination were concerned
with two particular types of secessions. First, there are instances in
185. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § l(d).
186. The governing boards of the affected areas do not have an unlimited right to
withhold consent. The constitution requires that the decision must be based on a
determination of "the over-all public interest," and it directs the legislature to provide
by statute for judicial review, applying the "over-all public interest" standard, of a
governing board's withholding of such consent. Id.
187. Even for clearly interlocal boundary disputes, there are dangers in allowing
legislatures to proceed by special laws, since special laws present just the sort of
opportunity for unprincipled meddling in local matters-of rewarding friends and
punishing opponents-that home rule was intended to prevent. A strong commitment
to home rule could require the state to adopt general legislation for the resolution of
boundary conflicts.
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which a city initiated the process of detaching territory from itself out
of a desire to avoid the burden of providing services to outlying areas.
For a city-initiated detachment, treating a local border adjustment as an
external matter protects the interests of the people who will be
"evicted" from the city and enables the state to address the burden
such an action may have on the surrounding county and adjacent municipalities.18 8 Second, in some cases a secession is the first step in a
two-step process of shifting territory from one existing municipality in
order to add it to another.1 8 9 In these cases, secession is intertwined
with a subsequent annexation and the entire matter may be placed
under the rubric of interlocal relations.
The Staten Island secession is quite different from these other
types of secessions, which are three-party disputes with the state stepping in to resolve an interlocal conflict. This secession has been initiated by Staten Islanders, so there is no occasion to fret over the plight
of residents ousted from ajurisdiction over their objection. This secession does not affect any other local government, since Staten Island
already is its own county and there are no municipalities adjacent to it.
Neither is Staten Island's territory being shifted to any other existing
municipality. There is really no interlocal dimension to this secession-unless the embryonic "City of Staten Island" is considered to
have a right to municipal life. That, however, is the issue to be decided.
This factual setting of a boundary dispute without an interlocal dimension, combined with the sharp contrast between the historical purpose
and common sense interpretation of home rule and the effect of the
secession law on the physical and political integrity of New York City
law, may explain why the Court of Appeals in the secession referendum
case bridled at finding that the state had plenary power to authorize
secession without a home rule message.
The Court of Appeals refrained from upholding the state's authority to redraw municipal boundaries, notwithstanding the powerful
precedents on the state's side. Instead, the court determined there was
no need to reach the issue of the state's power to effectuate secession
without the City's consent, since the secession law only authorized the
initial steps toward secession and therefore was not "an act formally
triggering secession."1 9 0 Moreover, two members of the court dissented, finding "no subject more directly concerns the affairs and government of a city than whether the integrity of its boundaries and of its
existing governmental structure should be altered." 1'9 For the dissent188. See, e.g., Village of Beechwood v. Board of Elections, 148 N.E.2d 921, 923
(Ohio 1958).
189. See,.e.g., Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287, 288-89 (6th Cir. 1984);
Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 476-77 (E.D. Ky. 1980); West Point Island Civic
Ass'n v. Township Comm., 255 A.2d 237, 240 (NJ. 1969).
190. City of New York v. State, 562 N.E.2d 118, 120 (N.Y. 1990).
191. Id. at 122 (dissenting opinion).
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ers, even the initial secession referendum "intrudes deeply into city affairs" and "the subject matter of the statute is essentially of local-not
19 2
State-concern."
3. The ParadoxicalConflict Between Home Rule and Local Self-Determination. - Although it was reassuring that the Court of Appeals declined
to dismiss the significant home rule issue presented by secession with a
ritual incantation of the doctrine of "state concern," the Court of
Appeals dissenters erred in assuming the absence of any substantial
state concern in the secession issue. The state may surely be said to
have a legitimate and important concern with the local government
provided to its residents.
The doctrine of "state concern" recognizes the state's interest in,
and ultimate accountability for, the well-being of all of its citizens, even
though most of those citizens also live in towns, cities, and other localities. Many problems of importance to the state will arise in specific
spatial locations; without some doctrine like "state concern," the state
would be unable to respond to citizen demands-often local citizen demands-for action on such problems.1 9 3 A generous reading of the
state's police power has been the longstanding foundation for modern
government's ability to respond to citizen concerns. Yet broad protection of state power to act is in profound tension with home rule, as state
actions may limit or supersede local decisions, and the deliberation and
resolution of local issues and local conflicts are transferred to the state
level.194 This conflict at the heart of home rule was perfectly captured
in Adler v. Deegan, 195 in which the state acted to meet the demands for
improved housing quality for the people of New York City but, in so
doing, displaced a decision of the City's government.
The tension between home rule and state power to respond to lo192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d 499, 503-04 (Utah 1975)

(urban blight treated as state problem even though particular blighted areas were
located within individual localities with no spillover effects).
194. Ironically for New Yorkers, the importance of New York City in the political,
economic, and social life of New York State has tended to mean that nearly anything
important to the City is a "concern" of the State, with extensive state displacement of

municipal control of local institutions and affairs as a result. See, e.g., Uniformed
Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New York, 405 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (N.Y. 1980) (prohibition

of City residency requirement for city employees); In re Board of Educ. v. City of New
York, 362 N.E.2d 948, 954 (N.Y. 1977) (state mandate of percentage of City's budget to

be devoted to education); Salzman v. Impellitteri, 305 N.Y. 414 (1953) (state takeover of
municipal transit system); Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 708-09 (N.Y. 1929) (state

code for City housing).
On the other hand, one scholar has suggested that because of the City's size and its
uniquely large percentage of the state's population, the state has accorded the City

considerable institutional autonomy and administrative support. See James C.
Musselwhite, Jr., A Comparative View, in The Two New Yorks: State-City Relations in

the Changing Federal System 25, 30-31, 38-46 (Gerald Benjamin & Charles Brecher
eds., 1988).
195. 167 N.E. 705 (N.Y. 1929).
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cal citizen demands is particularly poignant-indeed, paradoxicalwhen the demand is for local self-government. Considerable regulatory and fiscal authority, responsibility for the provision of public
goods and services, and the power to deliberate and determine a wide
range of public policy questions has been delegated to local governments accountable primarily to local electorates and subject to little active state oversight. There must be some legitimate and substantial
state interest in the municipal government arrangements for 379,000
people-a population large enough to constitute the second largest city
in the state. Regardless of the number of people involved, it must be
that just as the state can act to promote public health or civil rights at
the local level, so too it may act to promote local self-government. If,
because of political, economic, or social developments, sharp differences emerge within a municipality, it may become apparent to the
state that the residents of a portion of the municipality will be better
served if their community is carved out of the existing municipality and
given local independence.
Board of Estimate v. Morris 196 increases the likelihood that such a
concern will arise and makes the preservation of state power to act to
meet the self-government demands of local subunits more necessary,
since Morris makes it much more difficult for a state to require, or for a
city to provide, special representation for a distinctive territorial
subunit within the city. 197 With a "federal" solution unavailable to alleviate intralocal territorial divisions, 198 it may be appropriate to recognize some state power to redraw municipal boundaries not simply to
address interlocal conflicts, but also to assure that all local residents
have the opportunity for fair and effective local representation.
Moreover, at the symbolic level, although secession would certainly "intrude deeply into city affairs," it is not quite like the "ripper"
legislation of the nineteenth century. The separation of Staten Island
would not involve the arrogation of power to the state, or the transfer of
control over a major local function like police or rapid transit from locally elected officials to state appointees. 199 Secession does not
strengthen the state in the state-local struggle for power, but rather
transfers power from one local unit to another. Unlike the other forms
of state intervention, secession would not entail an ongoing displacement or disruption of the relationship between local people and local
196. 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
197. See, e.g., Russell Redman, One Man, One Vote, Empire St. Rep., Dec. 1991,
at 33 (Morris decision prompts suit challenging constitutionality of weighted voting
scheme for representing towns in the apportionment of Nassau County Board of
Supervisors).
198. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633,
665 (1991) (suggesting that reserving seats in a legislature for subunits to "provide a
form of proportional or even super-proportional representation" is a better way to
protect subunit interests than to make a constitutional provision for secession).
199. See, e.g., Salzman v. Impellitteri, 113 N.E.2d 543 (N.Y. 1953) (per curiam).
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government, or the services government provides. Rather, it is more of

a surgical strike, shifting "property, affairs or government" from one
local arrangement to another, but leaving municipal property, affairs,

and government in some locally elected and locally accountable
20 0

hands.
As with the right to vote, the home rule question turns on the
intractable problem of defining the proper unit for local selfdetermination when local interests conflict. New York City may say that
the state already did that-in 1896-when New York City was created,
and that thereafter home rule protects not the broad principle of local
self-determination but the specific municipalities that have been incorporated. Such a bright line would certainly serve to safeguard localities
from the opportunistic and partisan interventions of the nineteenth

century, and to prevent the legislature from utilizing the threat of
targeted detachment as a weapon in contemporary and future power
struggles. Such an approach, however, would freeze historic boundaries even when, because of changing patterns of development, new concerns about growth and the optimal size of cities, and evolving attitudes
about the factors that link or divide groups, residents would like to
restructure those boundaries. Treating self-determination for Staten
Island as solely a matter of the property, affairs, or government of New
York City would place the interests of a minority in the hands of a government that may be loathe to part with a substantial number of taxpayers or the principal remaining areas of open land within the City's
20 1
jurisdiction.
Staten Island's secession is a matter of both state concern and New
York City's internal affairs. The Court of Appeals majority in the secession referendum case got it right by deferring the issue, unlike the
lower court judges who opted for "state concern" and the appeals
court dissenters who saw only a "local concern." The "state-local" dis200. The secession of Staten Island could, of course, marginally reduce the
influence of New York City in state-level deliberations. After secession, the City would
account for a smaller proportion of the state's population and wealth, its legislative
delegation would hold fewer legislative seats, and the Mayor of New York City would
represent a slightly smaller constituency. Nevertheless, secession would not strengthen
the state, but would instead create another local government and another local voiceincluding a local chief executive and a local legislative delegation-that would
participate in state politics. That this new local interest might be adverse to New York
City does not make it any less local.
201. The City could also contend that the state ought to act by general law, rather
than special law, as the state has done with respect to the detachment of territory from
villages. See N.Y. Village Law § 18-1804 (McKinney 1973). But any general law that
seeks to balance the preservation of cities against the potential for self-determination by
city subunits by making the availability of secession turn on such factors as previous
independence, territorial distinctness (Staten Island is an island), current formal
existence as a political subdivision and not an informal neighborhood, and large
population and land mass would be challengeable as a special law for Staten Island in
effect if not in name.
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tinction required in Adler is difficult to draw in the best of circumstances
and virtually impossible to resolve here. But if secession proceeds, the
Court of Appeals will eventually have to face the question and determine on which side of the "state-local" line secession falls.
B. Reconciling State and Local Concerns: The Annexation Formula as a
ProceduralSolution
One way to approach secession would be to reconsider the "statelocal" dichotomy so firmly posited by ChiefJudge Cardozo in Adler and
recognize the presence of both interests. Although Cardozo warned
that a search for a predominant interest "involves comparisons too
vague and too variable, ' 20 2 the court's commitment to categorization
over balancing, combined with a general reluctance to rule any areas
out of the legislature's competence, has over time substantially undermined home rule. The principle that the state always wins may "serve
as an objective standard," 20 3 but it hardly comports with the constitutional commitment to some local immunity from state interference. On
the other hand, continuing to categorize but then finding no state concern in a matter in which there is some clear state interest also fails to
provide a satisfactory response to a difficult state-local problem.
Under the current interpretation of home rule, either New York
City can veto secession, or secession can occur without New York City's
formal participation in the process. Neither approach is satisfactory.
Instead, a secession procedure should recognize the presence of substantial state and local interests-and two sets of local interests-here.
An appropriate formula for holding together all three interests and
their overlapping commitments to local self-determination is suggested
by the state constitutional provisions for annexations: 20 4 (i) conduct a
referendum in the area seeking to secede in order to get an authoritative statement of the views of the people who would obtain municipal
independence; 20 5 then (ii) require the consent of the municipality from
which they seek to secede, since that municipality would be directly and
significantly affected by secession and ought to be allowed to participate in the process to protect its municipal integrity; but then
(iii) provide for a state-level review of the action of the existing munici202. Adler v. Deegan, 167 N.E. 705, 713 (N.Y. 1929) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
203. Id.
204. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § l(d).
205. This procedure need not preclude a referendum of the voters in the
remainder of the city, who may also wish to be heard on the issue. However, whereas a
negative referendum vote in the area proposed for secession would end the matter, a
negative vote in the remainder of the city would not be dispositive, although it would
provide other decision-makers with relevant information concerning the attitudes of the
city's electorate. If a majority of the voters in the remainder of the city actually
supported secession, that could make it easier for the city's elected officials to give their
consent or for state reviewing officials to find that the secession is in the "overall public
interest" of the city.
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pality, a review that could overturn the denial of consent to secession
on the basis of the "overall public interest" of the region.
This procedure would have the value of treating seriously the
claims to self-determination of both Staten island and New York City,
while preventing either group from taking unilateral action to the detriment of the other. New York City would be allowed to participate in
the process, but it could not veto secession. The "over-all public interest" review would provide for a final, state-level determination, and at
least provide some possibility of a decision that is both principled, with
the reviewing body giving reasons for its action, and contextualized to
the specific circumstances of the existing municipality and the area
seeking secession.20 6 As with every other aspect of the secession dispute, however, there are difficulties with this solution: How would the
procedure be adopted, and how would the "overall public interest"
standard be given meaning in this setting?
Though it is not clear that the Court of Appeals has authority to
impose this procedure, the court could interpret the annexation provision of the state constitution to apply of its own force to secessions.
Similarly, the court could treat the annexation provision as indicative of
the constitutional status of municipal boundaries, and weave it together
with the "property, affairs or government" language of home rule to
establish a secession procedure that would combine the City's formal
participation with the authority of the State to override the City's denial
of consent. Either approach would require a liberal infusion of the
home rule "spirit" of the constitution into its more straitened letter,
but either would also be consistent with the constitution's emphasis on
the protection of local autonomy. This procedure could also, of
course, be adopted by the legislature through an amendment to the
secession process.
In the absence of a legislative amendment or of a judicial willingness to find such a procedure in the existing home rule text, the Court
of Appeals should invalidate, on home rule grounds, any secession legislation adopted without the City's participation in the process. One
reason is pragmatic: Invalidation of such a secession enabling law is the
less drastic of the two alternatives. Whereas sustaining a secession
measure would actually separate Staten Island from New York City
without the City's participation, invalidating the secession enabling act
would simply preserve the status quo, including the possibility of a subsequent secession accomplished in a procedurally fair manner.
More generally, a requirement of City participation or consent as
part of the secession process should not be seen as an absolute barrier
to secession, but rather should be treated as the predicate for trilateral
206. This is similar to the procedure for secession-literally "deannexation"utilized in NewJersey. See, e.g, Ryan v. Mayor of Demarest, 319 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1974);
West Point Island Civic Ass'n v. Township Comm., 255 A.2d 237 (N.J. 1969).
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(state-city-Staten Island) negotiations over the determination of Staten
Island's share of the City's debts and other liabilities and the sale or
transfer of City-owned property on Staten Island to any new City of
Staten Island. Should secession actually occur, some allocation of New
York City's assets and liabilities would have to be made, either by state
imposition, negotiation, or litigation. The requirement of New York
City's consent to secession would not only constitute a proper recognition of the City's interest in home rule but would also give the City the
bargaining chip it needs to protect its interest in the New York-Staten
Island "divorce settlement. ' 2 07 Secession could still occur and the
Staten Islanders' interest in self-determination would be protected, but
only if they, or the state, would be willing to strike a deal that addresses
some of New York City's fiscal concerns.
Beyond the pragmatic, secession under the procedure outlined in
the 1989 and 1990 legislation-that is, state-mandated detachment of a
sizeable portion of municipal population and territory with no formal
role for the municipality-is simply too great an affront to the notion
that the constitution creates some sphere of municipal autonomy with
respect to local "property, affairs or government." Although the judicial exegesis of home rule has departed considerably from the constitutional text, that text, the rejection of the targeted state interventions in
local matters that gave rise to constitutional protection for home rule in
the nineteenth century, and the evolving aspiration to greater local autonomy that has led to repeated constitutional amendments expanding
the scope of home rule in the twentieth century, all reflect a concern to
provide some formal legal protection for the political integrity of local
governments against state interference.
Neither the history of the New York constitutional home rule article nor the concept of home rule itself plainly resolves the validity of
the present secession legislation. But judicial approval of state legislation that authorizes secession without giving New York City any role at
all in the procedure would be a statement that a city need not even be
consulted about a state action with major implications for its territorial
and structural integrity. Government actions have an expressive and
educational component as well as instrumental effects. 208 Secession
under the procedure outlined in the 1989 and 1990 legislation, and
judicial ratification of that course, would be an expression of disdain for
the very idea of home rule for existing municipalities and a public statement of how little a constraint home rule places on state actions. The
state has, and must continue to have, the power to regulate interlocal
207. Similarly, Staten Island's ability to bring a secession measure to the legislature
with the prospect that it will receive serious consideration enhances Staten Island's
ability to bargain with the City over the terms of secession, or over the City-Staten Island
relationship even if Staten Island remains in the City.
208. Philip B. Heymann, How Government Expresses Public Ideas, in The Power
of Public Ideas 88-100 (Robert B. Reich ed., 1990).
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relations, control local actions, protect local residents, and reorganize
the governance of metropolitan areas to promote regional well-being.
However, a secession procedure that assumes that an existing local
government has no legal interests in existing territorial and political
arrangements departs too far from the model of some state protection
of local autonomy that home rule presupposes.
Assuming the Court of Appeals applies the constitutional annexation procedure to secession, or the legislature adopts a secession procedure modelled on the annexation provision, there would still be
considerable difficulty in determining the content of any "over-all public interest" standard and deciding what state-level institution ought to
apply it. The annexation provision vests reviewing authority in the
courts, which have tended to view the "over-all public interest" standard through the framework of cost-benefit analysis. In effect, the
courts have attempted to tot up the advantages and detriments of
boundary change in terms of the scope and expense of municipal services and facilities, and to see if the gain to the area benefitted by boundary change outweighs any harm to the area losing territory. 20 9 Aside
from the inherently speculative nature of these calculations, this approach permits one unit's benefit to offset another unit's loss, even
though the beneficiaries do not compensate the losers, thereby ignoring distributional concerns. Alternative approaches in the annexation
case law in other states seem to entail putting a finger on the scaleeither by finding that any significant hardship to the seceded-from locality weighs heavily against secession 2 10 and thus favoring the status
quo, or by focusing primarily on whether there are gains to the area
seeking secession. 2 11 These approaches serve only to raise once again
the question of which local unit is the more appropriate focus of the
commitment to local self-determination.
The analysis of "overall public interest" might be advanced by
looking past the determination of benefits and costs for the particular
localities and considering the question in terms of the normative values
advanced by local governments in a metropolitan area. Would the metropolitan area as a whole be better served by the break-up of one large
municipality into two smaller ones? Conversely, are there normative
concerns that counsel in favor of continuing the consolidation of
Greater New York?
The standards for evaluating the benefits and costs of secession to
the region would be subject to normative debate, and the data concerning efficiencies, externalities, and wealth transfers between the secessionist subunit and the rest of the city that would be marshalled by the
209. See, e.g., Town of Lansing v. Village of Lansing, 438 N.Y.S.2d 29 (App. Div.
1981); City of Saratoga Springs v. Town of Greenfield, 312 N.Y.S.2d 4 (App. Div. 1970).
210. See, e.g., Ryan, 319 A.2d at 447-49.
211. See, e.g., West Point Island Civic Ass'n v. Township Comm., 255 A.2d 237,
241 (NJ. 1969).
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opposing sides would inevitably be hotly contested. Such a polycentric,
polyvalent analysis, entailing a combination of empirical expertise and
metropolitan policy-making, is inherently political rather than judicial,
suggesting that the public interest standard ought to be applied by the
legislature rather than the courts.21 2
Legislative action ought to include consideration of the City's objection to secession, assessment of the likely impact of secession on the
well-being of the metropolitan area, and justification for any decision to
override the City's position. The meaning of "overall public interest,"
then, would emerge out of this combination of data collection and analysis, presentation and examination of opposing positions, and legislative articulation of the reasons for its conclusions. One way to
accomplish this, including the development of a formal record and the
provision of an opportunity for all the relevant interests to be heard,
could be through the use of a special commission. The legislature has,
in fact, created a special commission in its current secession legislation;
but that commission, which is composed solely of Staten Islanders, is
intended solely to consider the implications of secession for Staten Island and to devise Staten Island's post-secession future. Its mandate is
not to assess the consequences of secession for the rest of New York
City. A different commission-one which included representatives of
the City as well as of Staten Island-would be necessary to examine the
likely consequences of secession for the City, the region, and the Island. Its report would provide independent research and analysis concerning the implications of secession for the metropolitan region,
reports which would enable the legislature to take the action in the
"overall public interest. '21 3
Although a full-scale analysis of the consequences of secession for
the well-being of the region is well beyond the scope of this Article, the
next Part undertakes some of the preliminary work, proposing a normative framework and suggesting some of the practical criteria that ought
to be considered by the legislature in ultimately determining the secession question.
212. The issue could also be delegated to an administrative agency. Indeed, a
number of states utilize administrative agencies for the resolution of boundary
questions. See, e.g., Our Localism I, supra note 90, at 81-85. Administrative agencies
could certainly be appropriate for the collection and analysis of data concerning the
economic consequences of secession. However, the administrative agency's evaluation
of the meaning of its data would clearly entail the application of political values.
Moreover, the process of appointment to the agency would take on considerable
political significance-particularly if the agency were created solely to deal with the
Staten Island question, or even if Staten Island were simply the first item on its agenda.
213. In addition to its participatory, fact-finding, and deliberative features, a
procedure consisting of a local referendum, formal participation by New York City,
study by a special state commission with representatives from the affected areas, and
ultimate decision by the legislature would resonate closely with the procedure that
culminated in the creation of consolidated New York at the end of the last century.
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SECESSION AND THE STRUCTURE OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

A. TheoreticalPerspectives
Just as there is no one theory for determining the proper territorial
scope of a polity, so too there is no generally accepted standard of how
to govern a metropolitan area. The debate over the appropriate structure for metropolitan governance has been informed by concerns for
efficiency, equity, and democracy. In this setting, efficiency refers to
the capacity of government to deal effectively with problems of regional
scope and to provide public goods and services at low cost.21 4 Equity

consists of all area residents receiving public services of comparable
quantity and quality, with the costs of those services distributed fairly
across the region. 21 5 Democracy includes representation of and accountability to area residents affected by public decisions as well as the
opportunity for people to participate in their own collective governance. 21 6 There are, of course, considerable tensions among these imperatives. A government structure may have to trade off some of one
value in order to make progress towards another, and it is likely that
no institutional design will be able to achieve all these goals
21 7
simultaneously.
At one time, the dominant school of thought emphasized the benefits of unified area-wide government. Only metropolitan government,
it was asserted, would have sufficient institutional capacity, public resources, and regional perspective to provide those services-such as
water supply, sewage disposal, pollution control, and transportationthat need to be handled on an area-wide basis. 2 18 Similarly, only metropolitan government would be able to engage in the comprehensive
area-wide planning necessary to permit coordinated regional development and reduce the costs of duplication and overlap. 21 9 Metropolitan
214. See Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Metropolitan
America: Challenge to Federalism 30-31 (1966) [hereinafter ACIR]; Howard W.
Hallman, Small and Large Together: Governing the Metropolis 180-82 (1977).
215. See ACIR, supra note 214, at 166; Scott A. Greer, Governing the Metropolis
114-17 (1962); Hallman, supra note 214, at 204.
216. See ACIR, supra note 214, at 32.
217. The existence of a trade-off between efficiency and equality has long been a
staple of the political economy literature. See, e.g., Arthur M. Okun, Equality and
Efficiency: The Big Trade-off (1975). A comparable trade-off may exist at the local level
between facilitating citizen participation and creating a local government capable of
dealing effectively with area problems. See Robert A. Dahl & Edward R. Tufte, Size and
Democracy 20-25 (1973) (contrasting "citizen effectiveness" and "system capacity"); cf.
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Trade-Off,
103 Pol. Sci. Q. 461 (1988) (suggesting that internal reforms that made Congress a more
representative body also weakened it in conflicts with the President).
218. See, e.g., Luther H. Gulick, The Metropolitan Problem and American Ideas 24
(1962).
219. The most prominent call for the consolidation of existing local governments
into larger units came from the report of the Research and Policy Committee of the
Committee for Economic Development, Modernizing Local Government to Secure a

824

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 92:775

government would also promote equity since all the people of a region
could call upon the regional tax base for the support of public goods
and services. Finally, an area-wide government would promote democracy: since a region was believed to share a set of common interests
binding residents together into a common community, a metropolitan
government was necessary to represent and respond to the interests of
2 20
such a regional community.
These analysts criticized metropolitan fragmentation and pressed
for regional governments. As suburban opposition repeatedly doomed
the consolidation proposals that would have created centralized regional governments, reformers developed proposals for "two-tier" or
"federative" plans that would move certain governmental functions to
the regional level while reserving others to pre-existing local governments. 2 21 However, for most of this century there has been little
political movement toward consolidation, 22 2 and today many metropolitan areas are fragmented into large numbers of localities. 2 23
Balanced Federalism (1966); see also Amos H. Hawley & Basil G. Zimmer, The
Metropolitan Community: Its People and Government 2-3 (1970) (positing that
consolidation of many political units into one municipal government would eliminate
conflicting jurisdictions and create adequage tax base for revenue); Vincent Ostrom et
al., Local Government in the United States 64-81 (1988) (presenting and criticizing this

view).
220. See, e.g., Greer, supra note 215, at 145-46.
221. See Committee for Economic Development, Reshaping Government in
Metropolitan Areas 19-20 (1970). The "two closest approximations" to the Committee
for Economic Development's two-tier model are Miami-Dade County, Florida, which
utilizes the existing county as the basis for a metropolitan-level government, and
Toronto, Canada, which has a "true federative government." JohnJ. Harrigan, Political
Change in the Metropolis 318-21 (4th ed. 1989).
222. The only significant consolidations, involving 250,000 or more people, in the

last half-century have been the two-tier metropolitan government in Miami-Dade
County, Florida, and the city-county consolidations of Nashville-Davidson County,
Tennesee, Jacksonville-Duval County, Florida, and Indianapolis-Marion County,
Indiana. Generally, most consolidation proposals require voter approval for adoption,

and suburban voter resistance has been effective in blocking most such proposals. See
generally John E. Filer & Lawrence W. Kenny, Voter Reaction to City-County
Consolidation Referenda, 23 J.L. & Econ. 179 (1980) (rejection of consolidation
proposals in suburban voters' economic self-interest); Vincent L. Marando, City-County
Consolidation: Reform, Regionalism, Referenda and Requiem, 32 W. Pol. Q 409
(1979) (as city-county wealth disparity increases, consolidation through referenda less
likely).
223. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Local Government in
Metropolitan Areas 37-74 (1985) (table 3). As evidence of the extent of contemporary
metropolitan area fragmentation, in 1982 there were 121 municipalities in Cook County,
Illinois; 89 in St. Louis County, Missouri; 56 in Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio;
and 123 in the three New York counties of Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester combined.
Id. A more recent study of St. Louis County, Missouri-which does not include the City
of St. Louis-reported 91 municipalities, including 23 with fewer than one thousand
residents and 71 with fewer than ten thousand residents. See Ronald J. Oakerson &
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In recent decades, as if in synch with the popular mood, 2 24 scholarly opinion has shifted away from consolidation. It is frequently argued today that efficiency and democracy concerns, at least, are more
likely to be addressed successfully in a fragmented metropolis.
The "most influential argument" 2-2 5 against metropolitan government derives from the public choice model, which grows out of the
work of Charles Tiebout. In his seminal article, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures,22 6 Tiebout saw, in the large numbers of local governments
and the relative ease of individual movement from one locality to another, a "market-type solution" to the question of how to determine
the level and mix of government expenditures responsive to popular
desires. The multiplicity of local governments in a metropolitan area
means that, as long as each locality is free to adopt its own mix of services, regulations, and charges, residents will be offered a wide array of
types and levels of public services and a wide variety of rates of taxation. An individual, as a "consumer-voter," can decide on the type and
level of services she wishes to receive and the tax burden she is willing
to assume by "shopping around" among the various localities in a metropolitan area before "purchasing" by moving to the one that best suits
her interests. 22 7 A large number of localities assures a range of choices
and increases the possibility that one place will meet the mobile consumer-voter's preferences. Municipal fragmentation promotes the ease
of relocation from one community to another and thereby helps create
a metropolitan market in public services.
Other public choice adherents have focused on the influence
consumer-voter movement exerts on local decision-making. Local governments will compete to retain their current taxpayers and to attract
new ones. This competition constrains local taxing and spending decisions and penalizes administrative inefficiency, thereby improving the
general responsiveness of local government to consumer-voter concerns while holding down the overall local government costs. In this
sense "rivalry among local governments is analogous to rivalry among
228
firms" in the provision of consumer goods.
Roger B. Parks, Citizen Voice and Public Entrepreneurship: The Organizational
Dynamic of a Complex Metropolitan County, Publius, Fall 1988, at 91, 96.
This extensive metropolitan fragmentation is due, in part, to legal changes that
have facilitated separate suburban incorporation and restricted the authority of cities to
annex new territory. In particular, cities must generally obtain the consent through
referendum of incorporated suburban areas as a condition to annexation or
consolidation. See generally Our Localism I, supra note 90, at 72-85 (discussing local
government formation laws).
224. Cf. Ostrom et al., supra note 22, at 73 (citing "popular resistance to
metropolitan reform" as a "source of doubt" about the wisdom of metropolitan
government).
225. Harrigan, supra note 221, at 309.
226. 64J. Pol. Econ. 416 (1956).
227. Id. at 417.
228. Ostrom et al., supra note 22, at 206. Cf. Mark Schneider, Intermunicipal
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Public choice, thus, tends to oppose the consolidation of smaller

localities into larger units; 2 29 indeed, it celebrates the multiplicity of

local units as the very guarantor of the capacity of the metropolitan
municipal services marketplace to accommodate differences in personal
preferences for public goods and services and to facilitate interlocal
competition. 23 0 The more governments there are in close proximity to
each other, the easier the exit mechanism that makes the whole model
work.
In addition to interlocal competition, public choice localists see in
small local governments, in contrast to the elephantine proportions of
metropolitan units, a likely source of efficiency. 23 1 They contend that
scale economies turn into diseconomies and drive up the unit costs of
public services as localities grow past a certain point, and although the
economically optimal local size is debatable, they assert it is far below
23 2
that of most of America's big cities today.
Public choice's preference for metropolitan fragmentation on efficiency grounds is reinforced by a strand of contemporary political theory that promotes local government as a setting for individual
participation in public life.23 3 In other words, "voice" as well as "exit"
Competition, Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrats, and the Level of Suburban Competition,
33 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 612, 625-26 (1989) (reviewing literature and finding that "on the
margin" an increase in number of governments in a region constrains size of
government but also noting that other factors, including region, intergovernmental aid,
and local wealth, affect municipal service expenditures).
229. See Ostrom et al., supra note 22, at 182-86; Robert L. Bish, The Public
Economy of Metropolitan Areas 55-56 (1971). Public choice theorists are critical of
restrictions on the incorporation of new municipalities, see Robert Warren, A Municipal
Services Market Model of Metropolitan Organization, 30 J. Am. Inst. Planners 193,
202-03 (1964), and metropolitan-area-wide government has been condemned as a form
of "full line forcing" that compels a taxpayer to pay for an entire package of government
activities rather than allowing him to select among various types and levels of public
services. See Richard A. Wagner & Warren E. Weber, Competition, Monopoly, and the
Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas, 18 J.L. & Econ. 661, 672 (1975).
230. See Warren, supra note 229, at 196.
231. Cf.Jane Jacobs, The Question of Separatism: Quebec and the Struggle over
Sovereignty 70-77 (1980) (discussing as one of the "paradoxes of size" the inefficiency
and bureaucracy that accompany large organizations).
232. See, e.g., Hallman, supra note 214, at 192-93 (citing studies suggesting that
population needed for scale economies is from 40,000 to 200,000).
Some contend that smaller units are also likely to reduce the costs of participation
in local politics. The "transactions" costs necessary for a collective body to reach a
decision relate directly to the size of the polity; the larger the group and the more
interactions within it, the more time and effort a collective decision will entail. So, too,
the costs of being on the losing side of political decisions tend to correlate with the size
of the polity, since bigger units are typically more heterogeneous and more people in
such units are likely to have preferences that diverge from the median. In smaller,
homogeneous units, there may be less internal disagreement, and thus fewer local
losers. See Bish, supra note 229, at 51-52.
233. Participation is valued as a form of personal political empowerment and as a
means for building a sense of community. See generally Richard Briffault, Our
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may support the multiplicity of governments in urban areas. 234 Participation in public collective decisions, it is asserted, can only occur in
small political units. 23 5 Small size facilitates the deliberative process,

the exchange of information and ideas, that is at the heart of participation. People in small units are believed to understand more about the
issues at stake and to know more about each other, thereby facilitating
public-spirited decision-making. 23 6 Furthermore, people in smaller
units may be more familiar with each other's needs and characteristics,
which in turn gives rise to greater good will, cooperativeness, and other
traits conducive to collective action. 23 7 Smaller units may have a
greater sense of community, and communality and participation will
be mutually reinforcing. The sense of community facilitates participatory decision-making, and participation builds up the sense of
community.

23 8

In addition, people in smaller units may be more likely to believe
that their participation counts, that they can make a difference. The
individual is more capable of being heard and of influencing a signifiLocalism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 393-95 (1990)
[hereinafter Our Localism II] (reviewing legal scholarship suggesting connection
between local government and political participation). Participation has also been seen
as an education in self-government, enabling people to learn about the issues,
processes, and institutions of government, equipping them with "individual attitudes
and psychological qualities," and providing them with an opportunity for "practice in
democratic skills and procedures." Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic
Theory 42 (1970).
234. For a public choice argument for metropolitan multiplicity that emphasizes
"voice" over "exit," see Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Metropolitan
Organization and Governance: A Local Public Economy Approach, 25 Urb. Aff. Q. 18,
24 (1989). For discussion of the convergence of "voice" and "exit" arguments in
support of local government fragmentation, see Our Localism II, supra note 233, at
403-05. The origin of the "exit" and "voice" typology of mechanisms for collective
decisionmaking is, of course, Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses
to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (1970).
235. See, e.g., Frug, supra note 174, at 1068-70; Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites,
Participation and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 930, 952
(1988).
236. Clayton Gillette puts it in economic terms: Small size permits repeated
interactions among identifiable members of the community. Once people see that fellow
community members are willing to look to the common good, they will also put
community interest over self-interest. Gillette, supra note 235, at 985. For Jane
Mansbridge, small size permits "face-to-face contact" and the attendant benefits of
"empathy and commitment to the common good." Jane J. Mansbridge, Beyond
Adversary Democracy 270, 275 (1980).
237. See Robert C. Wood, Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics 266-67 (1959).
238. But see W.E. Lyons & David Lowery, Governmental Fragmentation Versus
Consolidation: Five Public-Choice Myths about How to Create Informed, Involved, and
Happy Citizens, 49 Pub. Admin. Rev. 533, 540 (1989) (study consisting of surveys of
residents of five matched pairs of communities located in two metropolitan areas finding
little difference in fragmented area residents' versus consolidated area residents'
1) knowledge about government, 2) extent of participation in local affairs, 3) or sense
of efficacy about relationship with local government).
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cant portion of the community. The resulting enhanced sense of "citizen effectiveness" 23 9 will lead to more participation, which, by
confirming the sense of effectiveness, will contribute to continued
participation.
Proponents of decentralized metropolitan governance have responded to the assertion that many localities will be too small to provide basic services and that a politically fragmented region will be
incapable of dealing effectively with area-wide problems by contending
that these issues can be addressed, without consolidation, through interlocal agreements. 240 In this way the decisions whether and how
much of a public service to provide can be made in a small local unit,
but the service itself can be produced
and supplied by a larger entity if
241
that makes economic sense.
Proponents of metropolitan multiplicity have been less concerned
with responding to criticisms grounded in equity. As local public services are largely funded out of local tax bases, the division of metropolitan areas into localities of widely divergent tax bases creates
considerable interlocal fiscal disparities, and concomitant inequalities
in the cost and quality of local public services. 242 These fiscal disparities are closely connected to differences in the race, class and personal
239. Robert A. Dahl & Edward R. Tufte, Size and Democracy 61-62 (1973).
240. Local governments can purchase services from each other, form joint ventures
or create special purpose districts to supply services on a regional basis. See Robert L.
Bish & Vincent Ostrom, Understanding Urban Government 59-69 (1973); David J.
Elazar, Building Cities in America: Urbanization and Suburbanization in a Frontier
Society 145-47 (1987); Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of Government in
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 831, 838-42 (1961).
Some participationists also support the idea of resolving regional issues through
interlocal agreements. See, e.g., Gerald Frug, Empowering Cities in a Federal System,
19 Urb. Law. 553, 561-63 (1987).
Localities that are too small to provide basic services themselves can contract to buy
them from other governments. The model for this is the so-called Lakewood Plan,
named after a community in Southern California. In the 1950s, Lakewood was an
unincorporated area that sought to avoid annexation by the city of Long Beach. It
devised a plan to incorporate as a new city but to contract with the county to receive all
the county services it had previously received plus additional services necessitated by
population growth. Lakewood became the first municipality to exist on the basis of
purchasing all of its basic services from another unit of government. In the seven years
following Lakewood's innovation of its plan in 1954, twenty-five suburban communities
in Los Angeles County incorporated into independent municipalities. See generally
Gary J. Miller, Cities by Contract 10-22 (1981) (outlining political origins of the
Lakewood Plan).
On the role of interlocal agreements and special districts in the creation and
preservation of small local governments, see Our Localism II, supra note 233, at
374-80.
241. See Parks & Oakerson, supra note 234, at 21-22.
242. These enormous interlocal wealth differences-with a particular locality's
wealth having little or no connection to the extent of its service needs-are the premise
of the school finance reform litigations that have moved through the courts of at least
two dozen states. See Our Localism I,supra note 90, at 18-39.
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income of local residents. Indeed, fragmentation promotes interlocal
and interpersonal inequalities, as more affluent people relocate to
higher wealth jurisdictions. They are able to enjoy the enhanced local
public services at a lower tax rate that only a substantial tax base can
provide, while simultaneously immunizing their resources from the revenue demands of highly taxed, financially strapped central cities where
243
the poor and the dependent are increasingly concentrated.
Neither the public choice nor the participationist case for small local units gives much attention to the interplay of interlocal and interpersonal wealth differences, public service disparities, and the
multiplicity of local governments in a region. Instead, they assume that
these inequalities are to be addressed at the state or federal level,
through programs that could make the wealth of ajurisdiction less sig24 4
nificant in determining the cost or quality of local public services.
Such programs, however, have yet to materialize in any serious way.245
Indeed, federal urban policy is currently in retreat, with the federal
government today providing dramatically less assistance to local governments than it did in 1980,246 and the states doing only a little to fill
243. See Our Localism II, supra note 233, at 425 & n.343; Harrigan, supra note
221, at 309-10; Miller, supra note 240, at 196-202; Gregory R. Weiher, The Fractured
Metropolis 87-144 (1991).
244. These could include federal and state grants-in-aid; federal or state
assumption of the financial responsibility for certain services, such as education and
welfare, that are now at least partially locally funded; area-wide taxes or tax base
sharing; and state authorization for central city taxation of commuters' incomes earned
in the cities. See, e.g., Hallman, supra note 214, at 204-11.
245. As many intergovernmental assistance programs either reward existing levels
of local effort or are provided to all local governments, intergovernmental aid, even
when well-funded, is only modestly redistributive. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 240, at
188 (finding that in 1976 two of the wealthiest high-income cities in Los Angeles County
received federal aid of $12 and $28 per capita, while two of the poorest, low-income
cities received $5 and $9 per capita).
State efforts to assume more of the financial responsibility for education, the most
important locally funded service, have been halting at best. See Our Localism I, supra
note 90, at 18-39, 59-64. Minnesota has adopted a form of tax-base sharing for the
Twin Cities, see Our Localism II, supra note 233, at 449-50, but this step has not been
followed by other states. Only 18 of the 86 largest cities in the United States have
authority to impose any kind of income tax. Six of these 18 cities are in Ohio, but three
of them may not tax any commuter income, and four other cities are required to tax
commuter in-city earnings at a much lower rate than may be applied to city residents'
earnings. See Helen F. Ladd &John Yinger, America's Ailing Cities: Fiscal Health and
the Design of Urban Policy 126-27, 132-34 (1991).
246. Federal aid to cities declined from 18.4% of cities' own-source revenue in
1982 to 7.5% of cities' own-source revenue in 1988. The federal aid share of city
budgets in 1988 was significantly lower than it was in 1972. The effect of the drop in
federal aid more than offset the fiscal benefits that accrued for the average central city
during the economic expansion of the 1980s. See Ladd & Yinger, supra note 245, at
323-24. Among other actions, the federal government in the 1980s eliminated general
revenue-sharing and imposed budget cuts of more than 45% on such urban aid
programs as urban development action grants, housing subsidies, and employment and
training programs. See id.
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the financial void created by federal abandonment of the central cities. 24 7 Under these circumstances, interlocal inequality is the Achilles'

heel of all arguments for a fragmented metropolis.
B. Theoretical Perspectives in Practice: The Case of the Staten Island Secession
1. The Casefor Secession. - Although many contemporary scholars
have opposed the idea of metropolitan consolidation, they have focused more on resisting further central city expansion and on preserving small units than on the dissolution of existing large cities. 248
Nevertheless, from both the public choice and political participation
perspectives, Staten Island is an appealing case for municipal
independence.
For both sets of theorists, small is beautiful, or at least smaller is
presumptively better than bigger. As the largest city in the United
States, with a population greater than that of most states, New York
City must be too large to be efficient or to provide its citizens with the
opportunities for involvement in the critical aspects of public life that
make local autonomy so attractive. As Robert Dahl put it from a participationist perspective, "[t]o regard the government of New York as a
local government is to make nonsense of the term. '2 49 Dividing New
York City into two smaller municipalities- the smaller portion wellpositioned to reap the political and economic benefits of smaller sizewould clearly be an improvement.
Furthermore, there would be no uncertainty as to what ought to be
the boundaries of the new entity-the question that has led to bloodshed in the fragmentation of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet
Union 25 0 -since the boundaries of Staten Island are clearly marked by
247. Id. at 324-27.
248. However, a direct discussion of secession from a public choice perspective can
be found in James M. Buchanan & Roger L. Faith, Secession and the Limits of Taxation:
Towards a Theory of Internal Exit, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 1023 (1987).
Political localists have given less direct attention to the structure of governance in
metropolitan areas than have their economic counterparts. Gerald Frug, for example,
defines "city" expansively "to include the concepts of neighborhood and regional
government." Frug, supra note 174, at 1061.
249. Robert Dahl, The City in the Future of Democracy, 61 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 953,
968 (1967); see also Douglas Yates, The Ungovernable City 178 (1977) ("City hall is
obviously too large to be a viable neighborhood government ....").
250. One aspect of the conflict that has wracked Yugoslavia has been the armed
efforts of Serbs to detach Serb-populated areas that fall within the jurisdictional
boundaries of Croatia, and the Croat resistance to that effort. See, e.g., David Binder,
The Serbs and Croats: So Much in Common, Including Hate, N.Y. Times, May 16,
1991, at A14; Blaine Harden, Serbia Wields Power in Balkan Struggle; Croats Retreat
Before Guerrilla Drive, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 1991, at A8. Similarly, the former Soviet
republics of Azerbaijan and Armenia are locked in a bloody struggle over the
jurisdictional status of Nagorno-Karabakh, an enclave within Azerbaijan but populated
primarily by ethnic Armenians. See, e.g., H.D.S. Greenway, Old Foes, Freed From
Empire, Rage Anew, Boston Globe, Mar. 17, 1992, at 1. In addition, there are tensions
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geography and by historic political lines. Nor can there be any concern
that Staten Island would be too small for municipal independence; with
380,000 people it would actually be far 5larger than the optimal city size
2
dictated by most theoretical formulas. '
Under a public choice analysis, secession ought directly to benefit
Staten Islanders in the Tieboutian sense of improving the match between their preferences for local public services and the services they
actually receive from local government.2 52 Similarly, government in a
smaller city ought to be easier to influence, and the transaction costs of
political participation could be greatly reduced. Moreover, Staten
Island demonstrates both a considerable amount of internal homogeneity in such areas as race, socio-economic status, land use, home ownership, and household composition, and substantial differences in these
areas and in political affiliation from the rest of the City.2 53 With their
between Ukraine and Russia over the status of Crimea. The peninsula was historically a
part of Russia, but was awarded to Ukraine by the central authorities in the Soviet Union
in 1954. Some in Russia would like the territory returned, but Ukraine insists on
maintaining its current jurisdictional alignment. See, e.g., Celestine Bohlen, In RussiaUkraine Fight over Navy, Crimea Lies at the Heart of the Struggle, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31,
1992, at A6.
251. See supra note 232.
252. It is a very different question whether secession would "benefit" Staten
Islanders in the sense that Staten Islanders would receive better public services for the
taxes they pay, or conversely would be able to pay less taxes for the services they
currently receive. The question of whether, in effect, Staten Island is a net contributor
to or a net recipient from the rest of New York City, is beyond the scope of this Article.
253. Staten Island's population is 80% non-Hispanic white; in the City overall nonHispanic whites account for just 43.2% of the population. See 1990 New York Census
Summary, supra note 12, at 107 (Table 4).
The average family income is about 38% higher on Staten Island than in the rest of
the City, with 61% of Staten Island households having incomes greater than $25,000,
compared to 42% in the rest of the City. See Independence Feasibility Study, supra note
15, at 15.
Staten Island's land is primarily devoted to residential housing: only 5% of the
assessed real estate parcels on Staten Island fall into the two non-residential assessment
classes. In the City as a whole, 9%5 of the assessed parcels are non-residential, with that
percentage rising to 17% in Manhattan. Measured by assessed value, 53% of the
property on Staten Island is residential, compared to 41%o for the City as a whole and
317o for Manhattan. See New York City Dep't of Finance, Annual Report on the New
York City Real Property Tax, Fiscal Year 1992, at 19-24 [hereinafter Real Property Tax
Report 1992].
Moreover, 63.7% of Staten Island's housing units are owner-occupied, as opposed
to just 28.6% in the rest of the City. See 1990 New York Census Summary, supra note
12, at 289 (Table 12). In a city fabled as the home of apartment-dwellers, 82.1%5 of
Staten Island housing units are in structures of just one to four units; the comparable
figure for the City as a whole is just 36.1%. See id. at 199 (Table 8). Staten Island is
also distinctly more oriented to the traditional family than is the rest of the City: 59.5%
of Staten Island households are married-couple families, whereas just 38.9% of
households in the rest of the City are. See id. at 133 (Table 5).
With respect to political affiliation, Staten Island may be more heterogeneous, but
very different from the rest of the City. The City as a whole is overwhelmingly
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own municipality, more Staten Islanders may be on the winning side of
municipal decisions than they have been in the past. This could increase their satisfaction with and reduce their costs from local political
decisions.
Under the public choice model, the benefits of secession extend
beyond Staten Island. By creating a municipality immediately adjacent
to New York City, secession would increase the tax-service package options available to current New Yorkers and facilitate the possibility of
exit for residents of the remaining four boroughs. Admittedly, in a region that has over two thousand local governments, including seven
hundred municipalities, 25 4 New York area residents already enjoy a
wide array of tax-service package options, and it may be questioned just
how much one new city would add to the metropolitan marketplace.
Staten Island is, however, an area of comparatively large territorial
scope and includes considerable developable land; at the margin, at
least, its independence would provide some consumer-voters with a
new and potentially inviting place in which to shop for the municipal
facilities they desire, and a haven from the City taxes they might like to
avoid. Indeed, without having to exit New York City, some City residents might benefit from the very existence of an independent Staten
Island since the presence of this additional municipal "competitor"which would be the next largest city in the state and would be in close
proximity to the Manhattan central business district-might constrain
the taxing and spending practices of New York City.
It is even possible that some remaining New Yorkers, including
those with no intention or desire to move, might benefit from the departure from New York City's political arena of a bloc of voters (and
their representatives in the City Council) with views on taxes, services,
and public policy generally at variance from their own. Apartmentdwellers and businesses in Manhattan, for example, might gain from
the departure of a part of the constituency that has fought hard to keep
down property taxes on single-family homes and shift the tax burden to
multiple occupancy dwellings and commercial and industrial properDemocratic: 70% of the City's registered voters-and 81% of the voters who have
chosen to enroll in a party-are Democrats; only 147 of registered voters and 16% of
party enrollees are Republicans. See The Green Book 1991-92: The Official Directory
of the City of New York, at 468-69 [hereinafter Green Book 1991-92]. In Staten Island,
the division is much closer, with the Democratic edge among registered voters 50% to
30%, and among party enrolled voters 60% to 36%. See id. In recent elections Staten
Island has voted for Republicans for President, for Mayor, and for Borough President,
while the rest of the City was electing Democrats to those offices. See id. at 4. In
addition, Democrats on Staten Island may differ from the rest of the City's Democrats in
terms of political priorities. SeeJames C. McKinley, Jr., Staten Island Democrats Warn
Dinkins on Support, N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1991, at B3.
254. See Michael N. Danielson & Jameson W. Doig, New York: The Politics of
Urban Regional Development 4 (1982) (1977 study finds 2191 governments, including
780 municipalities, in 31-county tri-state region).
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ties. 25 5 More generally, the remaining New Yorkers could benefit from
the lower decision-making costs that might follow from the reduction in
the City's size, although the loss of population relative to the size of the
City is quite small and the transaction costs savings would be fairly
marginal.
Despite these theoretical benefits, secession would be a mixed
blessing. Secession is highly problematic under all three of the values-efficiency, equity, and democracy-that have animated the debate
over metropolitan governance. A preliminary examination of the secession of Staten Island as a case study in metropolitan organization
indicates how fragile the case for fragmentation is, and how tenuous the
assumptions underlying the public choice and participationist models
are. Moreover, secession reveals some interesting tensions within the
participatory and communitarian conception of democracy that has
generated the call for greater autonomy for small political units.
2. The Case Against Secession.
a. Efficiency and Externalities. - An efficiency-based defense of secession would have to come to grips with the increase in the external
effects of local government actions. The public choice model assumes
that the consequences of local actions are borne primarily within the
acting locality, that is, that they are "internalized." Tiebout makes this
premise express: in his idealized model, local government will be efficient only when locally supplied public services "exhibit no external
economies or diseconomies between communities. ' 25 6 New York City
and Staten Island, however, would not be self-contained municipalities,
set apart from each other. Instead the two are closely intertwined
around a common harbor, a shared economy, and an overlapping physical infrastructure. The decisions of each city are certain to affect the
other directly. Although the existence of externalities is an inevitable
consequence of multiple governments in metropolitan areas, and might
not by itself be sufficient to promote the further consolidation of New
York City with other localities in the region, surely the increase in external effects must be considered when the break-up of a city is
2 57
proposed.
The operations of the Fresh Kills landfill, the Staten Island site
255. New York City's one- and two-family homes are notoriously underassessed
relative to both other property in the City and similar residential parcels in the adjacent
suburbs. See Roger Starr, The Rise and Fall of New York City 194 (1985); Gerald C.S.
Mildner, New York's Most Unjust Tax, NY: The City Journal, Summer 1991, at 21, 21.
If Staten Island's departure could increase the relative clout of apartment-dwellers,
then, by the same token, single-family home-owners in Brooklyn and Queens could be
worse off after the secession of their allies.
256. Tiebout, supra note 227, at 419; see also Vincent Ostrom et al., The
Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 Am. Pol.
Sci. Rev. 831, 840-42 (1961) (examining problems created when provision of public
goods cannot be confined to boundaries of existing governmental units).
257. See also Our Localism II,supra note 233, at 426-27.
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where virtually all of New York City's solid waste is discarded, 25 8 reflects the interconnection of the two areas. The fate of Fresh Kills,
should Staten Island become independent, is uncertain since New York
City could retain ownership of the landfill even if it is outside of the
City's reduced municipal territory-the City owns reservoirs that form
a substantial portion of its water supply although they are located at
some distance from the City in upstate New York.25 9 Whichever city
gets the landfill, the other will be the loser. If New York City retains
ownership, the City would have less incentive to respond to Staten
Islander complaints about smells, hours of operation, transport practices of truckers and barges, and other problems, since the complainants are no longer constituents. On the other hand, if Fresh Kills is
transferred to Staten Island ownership, Staten Islanders have already
indicated an intention to rely on the fees New York City would be required to pay to continue to use the facility in order to provide a secure
financial base for the newly independent municipality. 26 0
Beyond physical infrastructure, each city would have a stake in the
laws and policies of the other. According to a study commissioned by a
leading secession proponent, most of the personal income of Staten
Islanders is earned in the other four boroughs of New York City.2 6 1
The City's tax and regulatory practices, its decisions concerning the na258. See Independence Feasibility Study, supra note 15, at 12.
259. The uncertainty of the fate of the landfill derives from the uncertainty as to
whether the state would have to pay New York City compensation if the City is divested
of ownership. This uncertainty, in turn, is traceable to the murky "governmental/
proprietary" distinction in local government law, and ultimately to the origins of
municipal corporations as hybrid public/private entities. See Hendrik Hartog, Public
Property and Private Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law,
1730-1870 (1983);Joan Williams, The Development of the Public/Private Distinction in
American Law, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 225 (1985) (reviewing Hartog book).
Under Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), a state may take property
held by a local government in its governmental capacity without paying compensation,
but, in dictum, the Supreme Court indicated that compensation may be required for
property held in a proprietary capacity. See id. at 179. The governmental/proprietary
distinction is notoriously difficult to draw. See, e.g., Janice C. Griffith, Local
Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 Iowa L.
Rev. 277 (1990). Although in later cases the Court indicated a reluctance to require
states to pay compensation for the taking of proprietary municipal property, see City of
Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923), the takings doctrine in this area remains
cloudy. Moreover, state law may require compensation for the taking of municipal
property. See Rudolph V. Parr, Comment, State Condemnation of Municipally-Owned
Property: The Governmental-Proprietary Distinction, 11 Syracuse L. Rev. 27 (1959). In
New York, "[t]he cases are in disarray" as to when compensation would be required. Id.
at 34.
260. See Independence Feasibility Study, supra note 15, at 2, 4. Other issues of
infrastructure interdependency would include the water supply for Staten Island (New
York City owns the water and the connections between Staten Island and upstate
reservoirs but might be compelled by the state to supply it at the "municipal" rate), the
operations of the Staten Island Ferry, and responsibility for New York harbor.
261. See Remedies of a Proud Outcast, supra note 54, app. A at 21.
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ture and scope of service delivery, and its investment in public goods
and services in the other four boroughs will have direct effects on the
business climate and on the possibilities of economic growth and development-or decline and decay. These will, in turn, affect the substantial number of Staten Islanders who make a living in the rest of the City,
as well as the remaining Staten Islanders who depend on those
commuters.
Conversely, New York City would be affected by the land use practices on Staten Island. While the City would not want to lose any current taxpaying residents or businesses to a newly independent Staten
Island, it would be much better for New York City if the businesses and
residents that emigrated settled on Staten Island than if they moved
further afield. Businesses in Staten Island might provide jobs for New
Yorkers, and residents of Staten Island might continue to return to the
City to work and shop. Staten Island's zoning laws and land use regulations, thus, would have a direct impact on New York, and yet after se26 2
cession the City would have no role in setting those rules.

Public choice theory suggests that local governments can deal with
the problems of spillovers through a process of interlocal bargaining,
accommodation, informal understandings, and contracts. 2 63 Agreements, presumably, could be worked out in all these areas of potential
dispute or shared interest. This, however, seems implausible.
Instances of voluntary interlocal cooperation 264 in areas like land
use planning and zoning, taxation, and general public expenditures are
rare. 265 Indeed, it would be naive to think that any city would be willing to bargain away its municipal birthright to make policy decisions in
the core areas of local autonomy. As the strenuous resistance of state
legislators from Long Island and Westchester to New York City's proposal to increase the personal income tax levied on commuters sug262. The City's past stewardship of land development on Staten Island has been
the subject of considerable controversy. Many have criticized the City for permitting in
the 1960s and 1970s "unfettered private sector" development, with the consequent
construction of "'jerry-built, rubber-stamp rowhouses,'" scattered across the Island
"with no consideration given to drainage, access, or the availability of city services."
Danielson & Doig, supra note 254, 107-08 (quoting noted architecture critic Ada Louis
Huxtable). An alternative perspective would be that the City allowed less exclusionary
zoning on Staten Island than is commonplace in the suburban communities in the
region.
263. See supra note 225-238 and accompanying text.
264. Some of these issues-the landfill, the water supply, the ferry-are so basic to
the separation of Staten Island from New York City that, I assume, they would have to
be worked out at the time of secession. In effect, they are issues for the state legislature

in determining whether, and on what terms, secession may occur. Although these
questions could, therefore, be answered at the outset of Staten Island's independence,

their resolution would be imposed by the state and not worked out through the
voluntary interlocal bargaining central to the localist model.

265. See Our Localism II, supra note 233, at 431-33.
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gests, 26 6 it is difficult to believe that Staten Islanders would ever offer
to contribute to the maintenance and improvement of municipal services in Manhattan even though Staten Island commuters would directly
benefit.
Any belief that interlocal disputes can be worked out by voluntary
agreement must be predicated on the assumptions that the leaders and
peoples of the two cities will approach each other with cool, rational
attitudes conducive to reaching agreements. However, it is more likely
that passion will outrank reason in a post-secession New York CityStaten Island relationship, especially if, as is probable, secession occurs
only after a hard-fought struggle. As Abraham Lincoln reminded the
seceding Southerners in the First Inaugural Address: "Physically
speaking, we cannot separate. "We cannot remove our respective sections from each other, nor build an impassable wall between them."' 267
Staten Island and New York City, like the North and South,
cannot but remain face to face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must continue between them. Is it possible then
to make that intercourse more advantageous, or more satisfactory, after separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than friends can make laws? Can treaties be more faithfully
268
enforced between aliens, than laws can among friends?
To be sure, not every spillover from City or Staten Island action
would mark an increase in the total cost of local government in the New
York area. Some external effects of an independent Staten Island
might simply reflect the reallocation of the expenses of certain public
services, such as solid waste disposal or ferry service, from Staten Island to the rest of the City, or vice versa. Given the costs and benefits
of these services, some such reallocation might be appropriate, and
even with the likely increase in intergovernmental tensions, it is certainly possible that the total efficiency savings from the separation of
Staten Island could outweigh the externality costs. The point of this
attention to externalities here is that even the strong efficiency case for
decentralization is not free from doubt, and requires a close attention
to the degree of public service and regulatory integration of Staten Island with the rest of New York City and to the costs of separation and
independent provision.
b. Equity. - The secession of Staten Island would raise numerous
equity concerns, although equity ultimately proves to be as slippery a
266. See Vivienne Walt, Dinkins' Budget Plan Placed on Legislature's Back Burner,
N.Y. Newsday, May 14, 1991, at 91; Frank Lynn, Legislative Races Linked to City
Problems, N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1990, § 12 (Long Island Weekly), at 1; Sarah Lyall,
Dinkins Commuter-Tax Plan Gets Cool Reception on L.I., N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at
B2; Rex Smith, Albany Report: Koch's Tax Suggestions Face Resistance, N.Y. Newsday,
May 8, 1989, at 19.
267. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, reprinted in Abraham Lincoln,
Speeches and Writings, 1859-1865 (Library of America 1989) 215, 221.
268. Id. at 222.
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criterion as efficiency and fails to be dispositive of the merits of secession. First, the purported efficiency benefits of secession would be unequally distributed. The central lever of the economic model is
interjurisdictional mobility, but not all people are equally mobile.
Movement is constrained by a variety of economic and social factors
that tend to affect poorer people more than affluent ones. 2 69 Limits on

personal resources as well as differences in "tastes" for municipal services will determine which New Yorkers avail themselves of the opportunity to exit to an independent Staten Island. 270 Of course, to say that
some would benefit more from secession than others does not itself
27 1
require a conclusion that secession is inequitable.
Second, a Staten Island secession would constitute a loss of wealth
and tax base for New York City. Admittedly, with only five percent of
the city's population and an even smaller percentage of its assessed valuation, Staten Island constitutes only a minor portion of the City's tax
base. 2 72 There is relatively little commercial or industrial activity on

Staten Island, 273 and the single-family homes that dominate Staten Island's housing stock are notoriously underassessed. 274 Indeed, upon
independence Staten Islanders might face a hefty increase in the local
property tax since they would no longer benefit from the Manhattan
central business district office properties that are the core of the City's
5
tax base.

27

Still, the departure of Staten Island could reduce the City's eco269. These include the out-of-pocket costs of relocation, the limited range of job
opportunities available to people lacking education or skills, the costs of commuting,
and the lack of affordable housing in the places that might be desirable sites for
relocation. See Our Localism II, supra note 233, at 420.
270. See Ladd & Yinger, supra note 245, at 293-94; John R. Logan & Harvey L.
Molotch, Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place 39-43 (1987).
271. Arguably, the departure of Staten Island could worsen the political position of
those New Yorkers for whom exit is too costly to be a viable alternative. The existence
of an independent Staten Island may make the City's government more sensitive still to
the allocative demands and policy preferences of the more affluent New Yorkers for
whom exit has become a more credible option. Thus, a Staten Island with lower taxes
and better middle class services just across the harbor may help tilt the balance against
poorer New Yorkers in the City's ongoing internal municipal class struggles over the
type and distribution of public services. On the other hand, by removing a middle class
component from the City, secession could strengthen the relative strength of the poor in
the City's politics. Cf. supra note 255.
272. For fiscal year 1992, real property on Staten Island has an assessed valuation
of $2.76 billion, or approximately 3.3% of the City's total assessed valuation of $83.6
billion. See Real Property Tax Report 1992, supra note 253, at 19, 24.
273. Only 4.98% of the real estate parcels and 33.85% of the assessed valuation
fall within Class IV, which is commercial and industrial property. This compares with
8.64% of real estate parcels and 53.36% of assessed valuation Citywide-and 17.13% of
parcels and 65.62% of valuation in Manhattan. See id. at 19-24.
274. See supra note 255.
275. See Peter Passell, Economic Watch: Can S.I. Flourish Without New York
City?, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at B1.
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nomic strength. At a time of extreme fiscal stringency and in an era of
chronic urban crisis, the loss of any fraction of the City's tax base would
be a blow, and the secession of Staten Island would affect sales and
income tax payments as well as the tax on real property. In addition, as
the one borough with significant open spaces, Staten Island has been
and is likely to continue to be the area of the city where population and
property values are most likely to increase. This potential tax base
2 76
growth would be lost to the City after secession.
Of course, tax base is only one side of the fiscal equation. It is
certainly possible that Staten Islanders consume more in municipal
services than they pay in local taxes. This actual "balance of trade"
between the Island and the rest of the City is uncertain. If Staten Island
were in effect a drain on the municipal coffers, the argument from lost
tax base would obviously have considerably less force, although the loss
of land for development and the potential for future tax base growth
would remain.
A broader equity implication of secession would be the degree to
which it would effect a separation of the relatively affluent from the relatively needy. The average family income on Staten Island is about
thirty-eight percent higher than in the rest of the City, with sixty-one
percent of Staten Island households having incomes greater than
27 7
$25,000, compared to forty-two percent in the rest of the City.
Staten Island has the highest percentage of high school graduates, the
highest median family income, the lowest percentage of families with
no workers, and the smallest incidence of families below the poverty
278
line of any borough in the City.
The Staten Island-City differences, however, should not be exaggerated. This would be not so much the "secession of the successful,"'2 7 9 as the secession of the socio-economic center. Staten Island is
not a wealthy enclave, but a solidly middle-class borough. 280 Its residents are less well-heeled than many area residents; its affluence is relative to the rest of the City. Still, the secession of Staten Island would be
yet another instance of the intermunicipal separation by class, income,
and race that is so characteristic of the United States today.
Secession would enable Staten Islanders to escape from New York
City's economic and social problems while continuing to benefit from
proximity to the City and access to its jobs, public facilities, and cultural
resources exactly as it did prior to secession. Although most of the
personal income of Staten Islanders is earned at work in the rest of New
276. See Danielson & Doig, supra note 254, at 262.
277. Independence Feasibility Study, supra note 15, at 15.
278. See Bohanek, supra note 46, at 39.
279. Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6
(Magazine), at 16; cf. Buchanan, supra note 24, at 16-17 (discussing issues raised by the
"secession by the better off").
280. See Bohanek, supra note 46, at 40-42.
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York City, 28 1 after secession they would be liable to pay no more than a
trivial commuter income tax, held down by the legislature to a small
fraction of the City personal income tax. 28 2 Commuters directly benefit
from certain city services-police and fire protection, traffic control,
road maintenance, mass transit, and the water supply. 28 3 They benefit
indirectly from all local public spending that promotes the economic
and social well-being of the place where they earn their living. 28 4 Studies have found a close correlation between the per capita cost of city
services and the commuter percentage of city employment. 28 5 Given
the constraints on City taxation of commuters and the absence of any
provision for municipal tax base sharing, secession would provide
Staten Islanders with "the sweet" of the New York City economy without "the bitter" of the taxation necessary to address New York City's
28 6
pressing needs.
Staten Island, of course, would be no better off than other suburban jurisdictions that also depend on a central city for the financial
well-being of many of their residents. That, however, just restates the
general problem posed by the existing fiscal structure of metropolitan
areas in which commuter suburbs are able, through municipal independence, to reduce greatly their contribution to the pressing needs and
costs of the center city's poor and to the tax burden of the remaining
urban middle class. 2 87 Whether the reduced fiscal support departing
281. Remedies of a Proud Outcast, supra note 54, app. A at 21.
282. Compare N.Y. Tax Law §§ 1304, 1304-A (McKinney 1989) (highest marginal
rate of taxation on income earned by City residents is 3.4% plus 0.51% surcharge) with
N.Y. Gen. City Law § 25-m-2-A (McKinney 1989) (tax on nonresidents' earnings in New
York City is 0.45% of wages and 0.65% of net earnings from self-employment).
Suburban representatives in the state legislature have strenuously resisted all City
efforts to increase the commuter tax, including Mayor Dinkins' plan to earmark
increased commuter tax revenues for public safety programs. See sources cited supra
note 266. As secession would shift Staten Island's legislative delegation from the
interests of the City to that of the suburbs, the likelihood of any increase in the
commuter tax would be further reduced.
283. See Ladd & Yinger, supra note 245, at 87, 296.
284. As Ladd and Yinger have found, much of the benefit of city economic
development programs and the increase in urban employment during the prosperity of
the 1980s actually accrued to non-city residents. In effect, much of central city job
growth consists ofjobs held by commuters. See id. at 25.
285. See id. at 87.
286. Senator Marchi's study candidly states that one scenario for the Island's future
development is a "symbiotic" relationship with New York City, with Staten Island "a
bedroom-style community priding itself on increased levels of desired services to
homeowners but continuing to remain dependent on New York City for jobs."
Remedies of a Proud Outcast, supra note 54, app. A at 21; see also Independence
Feasibility Study, supra note 15, at 32 (similar scenario "assumes a continuing symbiotic
relationship with New York City within which the quality of life on Staten Island is
improved significantly" and that "any scenario for the future of Staten Island is
grounded in the economic and demographic conditions of New York City and the New
York-New Jersey Metropolitan Statistical Areas").
287. Some studies, however, have questioned the "suburban exploitation" thesis,
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suburbanites provide to central cities creates an inequity is uncertain,
however, because the normative obligation of suburbanites to cities is
an unresolved issue.
In our society, arguments for redistribution tend to operate within
borders; that is, the notion of a duty to provide support for the needy
and afflicted proceeds largely from a sense of membership in the same
community. "[I]t is often said that our positive obligations to our fellow citizens are much more substantial than those we have toward
'strangers.' "288 "Community" could include nation, state, city, or
neighborhood, but where the equity issue is raised in the context of a
municipal secession, the concern is that the secessionist subunit, particularly if it is a relatively prosperous one, is seeking to reduce the burden of local taxes paid to assist the local poor. From a central city
perspective, such a secession would be an instance of the affluent shirking their obligations. But once the secession is actually accomplished,
the secession area would have no greater obligation to the poor of the
city left behind than would any other members of the broader society.
In other words, whether secession is inequitable turns on a background assumption of a duty of distributive justice based on common
membership in a community. However, to say that members of a community have duties to each other tells us nothing about how a particular
community is to be defined. The leitmotif of the voting rights and
home rule discussions-should an area be treated as one polity or more
than one-recurs in determining the social duties as well as the political
rights of metropolitan area residents. Duties appear to follow from
borders, not the other way around.
The positive consequences of the secession of a relatively affluent
area from a city can be seen clearly in the loss of fiscal support for the
central city and its increasingly needy residents, but the normative
characterization of such reduced support as "inequitable" is undetermined. The real source of inequity is not secession but the fragmentation of metropolitan government into wealth- and income-segmented
municipalities, unaccompanied by adequate higher level government
mechanisms for redistributing resources from high-wealth to high-need
jurisdictions. So long as our governmental structure permits radical interlocal differences in fiscal resources and the quality of support for
local public services, it is difficult to censure one part of the metropolitan area for seeking to follow the same path of isolation from central
city needs marked out by so many other suburban jurisdictions.
suggesting that the suburban commuter contribution to the economic prosperity of the
city and the concomitant enhancement of city property values offsets the suburban use
of city services and suburban benefit from city economic activity. See David F. Bradford
& Wallace E. Oates, Suburban Exploitation of Central Cities and Governmental
Structure, in Redistribution Through Public Choice 43, 45-51 (Harold M. Hochman &
George E. Peterson eds., 1974).
288. Buchanan, supra note 24, at 115.

1992]

LOCAL SELF-DETERMINATION

Finally, secession raises an equity concern that is different in kind
from that created by the incorporation of previously unincorporated
areas on the urban outskirts. As previously noted, the distinctive feature of a secession is the departure of people who take their land and
the fixtures appurtenant to that land with them. Staten Island differs
from other suburban communities in the metropolitan area in that for a
century it has directly benefitted from New York City's creation of a
public infrastructure on the island. Indeed, secession could constitute
a redistribution of wealth from the City to Staten Islanders in the most
literal sense: they would probably receive the extensive municipal
physical infrastructure built on the island. At the time of consolidation,
Staten Island's "development was hampered by inadequate transportation, and by the absence of unified schools, satisfactory water, sewer,
police and fire protection. ' 28 9 The provision of "Catskill water supply,
electric street lights, paved roads and sidewalks, and sewers" all followed in the decades after consolidation, and was paid for by the taxpayers of New York City. 290 By the City's estimate, there are today 650
miles of sewers, 885 water pipes, 33,475 street lights, 1,025 miles of
paved streets, 3 municipal hospitals, 3 police stations, 18 firehouses, 11
libraries, and 55 schools on Staten Island 2 9 1-all of which were provided by the City of New York out of municipal taxation over the course
of the century. While New York City could continue to use the Fresh
Kills landfill and would, no doubt, vigorously defend its ownership of
that facility, it is difficult to see how or why the City could retain ownership of the sewers, water pipes, streets, and street lights and other public infrastructure intended to serve the people in the immediate vicinity.
Thus, if Staten Island were to secede, those facilities would most likely
be turned over to the newly independent municipality.
Whether this redistribution of municipal wealth constitutes an inequitable expropriation would then turn on whether the City receives
fair compensation. The "governmental/proprietary" distinction is
often fuzzy, but this property would most likely be considered governmental, 2 92 so that neither the state nor the independent City of Staten
Island would have to pay New York City compensation. In the absence
of a legal duty, the state still might provide compensation for New York
City's investment on Staten Island, either to win New York City's consent to separation if such consent proves legally necessary or because
the politics of enacting secession legislation might require it. In short,
the existence of considerable New York City investment on Staten Island that would probably pass to a new municipality raises an important
289. Jacqueline Overton et al., Long Island and Staten Island since the Revolution,
in 10 History of the State of New York 135, 166 (Alexander C. Flick ed., 1937).
290. Id.
291. See Affidavit of Joel Berger at Exhibit C, City of New York v. State, 556
N.Y.S.2d 823 (Sup. Ct. 1990) (No. 46770/89).
292. See supra note 259.
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fairness concern, but that concern could be addressed in the terms of
29 3
separation and need not pose an absolute barrier to secession.
c. Democracy. - The relationship of secession to democracy is as
debatable as the implications of secession for efficiency or equity. Secession also raises questions concerning the connection between participatory democracy and homogeneous communities that bring out the
ambivalence within the participationist argument concerning the value
of homogeneity in localities. On the one hand, much of the case that
local autonomy enhances the possibility for effective participation is
based on assumptions of shared interests, experiences, values, and
norms in local communities. 294 Common backgrounds, goods, and
concerns promote an empathy conducive to collective decision-making
and increase the possibility that individuals will be able to put aside
their own self-interest for the local common good. 2 95 This implicitly
assumes a significant amount of homogeneity of interests at the local
level, and tends to establish a case for homogeneity as a vital component of effective, politically active local communities.
On the other hand, much of the rhetoric about the virtues of local
autonomy celebrates the potential for the resolution of difference
through discussion, deliberation and debate. The educational component of local public life is built around people learning from each other
and together building bridges across their differences toward the resolution of common problems. This theory, of course, assumes differences and places a positive value on local heterogeneity.
As already noted, the secession of Staten Island would be a move
toward greater homogeneity for both Staten Island and New York City
along many of the lines of division in our society. Staten Island is a
predominantly white, middle class, home owner community. It is far
less diverse along the dimensions of ethnicity, class, land use, and
household structure than the rest of the city. There would simply be
far fewer economic and social differences in an independent Staten
Island than in the city it would leave. There might be fewer wrenching
municipal issues to struggle over as well. Staten Island is certainly
much less subject to the social stresses and strains that so burden New
293. Related to the "equitable distribution" of the municipal property on Staten
Island is the allocation of the obligation to repay New York City's indebtedness. The
departure of Staten Island, with its property tax base and its location as a site for
transactions subject to the City sales tax and as a home for residents subject to the City
personal income tax, arguably impairs the security of New York City's bondholders, an
interest they may enforce through the Contracts Clause. The secession of Staten Island
would have to include some assignment of a portion of New York City's debt to the new
city. The formula for such an allocation-which could be based on the share of New
York City's population on Staten Island, the share of the debt-funded capital
infrastructure on the Island, or other factors-would surely be subject to debate.
294. See Dahl & Tufte, supra note 239, at 13-14; Mansbridge, supra note 236, at
270-73.
295. See Gillette, supra note 235, at 964-68.
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York City. A significantly smaller percentage of its population is either
in or near poverty, and a comparably smaller percentage receives public assistance. 29 6 Its crime rate is well below that of the City as a
whole. 2 97 Being a part of New York City forces Staten Island, which in

most demographic, economic, and social senses is far more like a suburb, to come to grips with urban problems.
The departure of Staten Island would also make New York City
more homogeneous in certain ways. The City would lose many of its
Republican elected officials and the only borough that frequently votes
Republican in municipal elections. 2 98 The City would also lose a noticeable chunk of its middle class and a strong voice for homeownership
interests: with five percent of the City's residents, Staten Island has
eighteen percent of the City's single-family owner-occupied dwell-

ings. 29 9 In effect, Staten Island brings a little of the suburb-and, per30 0
haps, a little of the rest of the United States-into the great city.
The separation of Staten Island from the other four boroughs
might promote internal empathy within each resulting city, thereby
making each municipality easier to run, and would expand the opportunities for and satisfactions of citizen participation in local govern-

296. See An Independent Staten Island: Fiscal Implications, in Remedies of a
Proud Outcast, supra note 54, app. A at 18; Passell, supra note 275, at B1.
297. See Robert D. McFadden, New York Leads Big Cities in Robbery Rate, but

Drops in Murder, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1991, § 1, at 28. In 1990, homicide rate on
Staten Island was 7.7 per 100,000 residents, compared with 30.9 for the city as a whole.
In the same year, the robbery rate of Staten Island was 2.7 per 1000 residents, compared
with 13.7 for the city as a whole. The Staten Island rates for these two major crimes
were less than half the rates in the next lowest crime borough, Queens. See id.
298. During the 1980s the only Republicans holding elected municipal office were
Council members from Staten Island. In 1991, for the first time in more than a decade,
voters in Manhattan and Queens also elected Republicans to the City Council. Still, two
of the five Republican Council members are from Staten Island, see James C. McKinley,
Jr., New York City Council Results Show Ripples of Change, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1991,
at BI. Moreover, the only borough-wide elected Republican official is the Staten Island
borough president, see Green Book 1991-92, supra note 253, at 24-27.
In the 1989 mayoral election, Republican Rudolph Giuliani lost to Democrat David
Dinkins by 47,000 votes out of a total of 1,815,000 cast. Giuliani swept Staten Island by
a margin of 67,000 votes. Green Book 1991-92, supra note 253, at 4. Giuliani fought
the second closest mayoral election in the history of Greater New York. See Sam
Roberts, The New York Vote: Almost Lost at the Wire, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at 1.
Without Staten Island Dinkins' margin of victory would have been more than double
what it was.
299. See 1990 New York Census Summary, supra note 12, at 244 (Table 10).
300. Population density figures nicely illustrate the nature of Staten Island as a
community poised between city and suburb. The population density of New York City
as a whole is 23,705.3 per square mile. In Manhattan that figure rises to 52,378.0 per
square mile, but even in the relatively low-rise borough of Queens density is 17,839.1
per square mile. In the adjacent suburban counties of Nassau and Westchester densities
are 4,488.7 and 2,020.9, respectively. With a density of 6,467.2, Staten Island falls
between the rest of the City and the inner suburbs-although closer to the suburban
than to the central city end of the continuum. See id. at 355, 361 (Table 16).
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ment-especially on Staten Island-but by the same token it would
make each city somewhat narrower and probably more parochial in
outlook.
True political and cultural pluralism is advanced not by the separation of different groups into distinct municipalities but through political
structures that promote interaction and require mutual accommodation
to different perspectives. As the New Jersey Supreme Court put it in
applying its standard of "social detriment" when reviewing a petition
for detachment,
[w]e would suggest that social detriment might be found in a
community's being deprived of [the secessionists'] participation in the religious, civic, cultural, charitable and intellectual
activities of the municipality; their meaningful interaction with
other members of the community and their contribution to its
prestige and social standing; the part they play in [the] general
scheme of their municipality's social diversity; and, conceivably, the wholesome
effect their presence has on racial
30 1
integration.
Beyond the general significance of a reorganization that would
produce new and more homogeneous polities, features of this secession may be particularly troubling. First, at a time of highly charged
racial tensions,3 0 2 secession would constitute a mass exodus of a
predominantly white, middle class community from a jurisdiction
marked by extremes of rich and poor and an emerging majority of people of color. Staten Island secessionists angrily bridle at any imputation
of racist motivation, and insist that their movement is prompted by a
mix of resentments over the City's use of Staten Island's land to locate
undesirable facilities, the quality of local public services and the uses of
their tax dollars, and a general interest in self-determination.3 0 3 But
the broad socially demoralizing effects of white flight-and this would
be white flight on a grand scale-go beyond the motives and intentions
of individuals. Secession would be seen by many as one further instance of white, middle-class people choosing to separate themselves
from poor, nonwhite people-the pattern characteristic of our metropolitan areas. This time, however, whites would not even have to undergo the inconvenience of moving to do so.
Second, the Staten Island secession is plainly a response to the
Morris decision,3 0 4 yet Morris was simply a determination that the dem301. Ryan v. Mayor of Demarest, 319 A.2d 442, 449 (NJ. 1974).
302. See, e.g.,Jim Sleeper, The Closest of Strangers: Liberalism and the Politics of
Race In New York (1990);Jonathan Rieder, Canarsie: TheJews and Italians of Brooklyn
Against Liberalism (1985).
303. See, e.g., John J. Marchi, Letter to the Editor, Marchi Responds on Secession
Issue, N.Y. LJ., Apr. 24, 1991, at 2; JohnJ. Marchi, Letter to the Editor, State Senator
Disputes Article on Secession, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 13, 1991, at 2 [hereinafter Marchi
February Letter].
304. See, e.g., Marchi February Letter, supra note 303, at 2.
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ocratic rule of "one person, one vote" ought to apply to Staten Islanders in their relations with the rest of New York City. As the Supreme
Court has explained, equal representation for equal numbers of people
is the one constitutional "ground rule" of American representative institutions.3 0 5 Staten Islanders are represented in City government, and
their representation is exactly that to which their numbers entitle them.
To claim as a "grievance" that it is no longer receiving extra representation may itself be an affront to democratic norms.
Staten Islanders justify their sense of unfairness at being subjected
to the standard rule of representation based on population with the
claim that they are a minority within the Citya-a literally "discrete and
insular" one-and that they need the extra representation to protect
their interests. Even though municipal deliberations are conducted according to democratic rules and are subject to the protections afforded
fundamental rights, Staten Islanders fear that because of the differences between themselves and other New Yorkers they will be consistently disfavored by the outcomes of local politics. To return to the
question of the proper "self" for local self-determination,30 6 Staten Islanders are asserting that they are a distinct group with distinct interests apart from those of other New Yorkers. If they cannot receive
extra representation within New York City, then they say they need to
have a separate local polity of their own.
The political participation argument for local autonomy has no answer to the question of whether a group that sees itself as a dissenting
faction should stay in the old community or be allowed to break away
and establish a new one. In the participationists' heady rhetoric, deliberation and debate lead to the resolution of conflict and the reconciliation of differences. In their model (like the economists'), there are no
winners or losers, rather, everybody wins, and not much attention is
paid to what happens when conflicts are not settled and differences not
accommodated.3 0 7 There may, however, be groups within a political
community that are consistently defeated even when the political process is played according to democratic rules. Would democratic values
be better served if that jurisdiction is preserved as one polity or broken
up? As noted in the discussion of the secession referendum franchise in
Part II, there is no abstract standard within democratic theory for
resolving this dilemma.
The most celebrated statement in our political culture concerning
the relationship between secession and democracy was that put forward
by Abraham Lincoln on the eve of the Civil War. According to Lincoln,
305. See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).
306. See supra notes 126-134 and accompanying text.
307. This may be so because despite all the talk about the reconciliation of
differences, participationists have a mental model of relatively homogeneous
communities when they speak of local autonomy, so the question does not arise for
them.
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secession is fundamentally at odds with democratic self-government
based on majority rule; indeed,
the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy. A majority, held in restraint by constitutional checks, and limitations, and always changing easily, with deliberate changes of
popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of
a free people. Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a
minority, as a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible;
so that, rejecting the majority principle,
anarchy, or despotism
30 8
in some form, is all that is left.
Lincoln's position is too strong. If democratic theory can yield no
metric for determining the proper dimensions for a polity, it cannot
preclude the possibility that some polities, riven by internal "irreconcilable differences," might be better off divided into separate new entities.
Simply because the notion of a right to self-determination does not tell
us which groups should have their own states, that does not mean that
two groups might not be better off if separated into distinct states. The
American Revolution was such a secession; 30 9 as was the peaceful separation of Norway from Sweden.3 1 0 Lincoln himself played a role in the
separation of the people of the mountainous part of Virginia-now
known as West Virginia-from the rest of their state.3 11
It may be more accurate to modify Lincoln's statement and say instead that secession is a reflection of profound pessimism about the
capacity of a polity to handle serious internal differences democratically
and to govern all residents fairly. The call for a secession is a cry of
despair from a minority about the capacity of majority rule to work for
them. Authorization of secession by a higher level unit of government
is tantamount to a conclusion that the economic, social, or demographic factors that separate the groups in a polity are so deep as to
constitute unbridgeable chasms, precluding the empathy, mutual trust,
and forbearance necessary to make one state work for all its people.
In a sense, this criticism is a variation on the theme of secession as
an alteration of the status quo. Even if from a public choice or a participatory perspective both Staten Island and New York City would
have been better off if they had never been joined, there can be real
harms from the separation-the costs of disentangling shared public
services and regulatory policies; the loss of middle class residents from
the central city; the potential unfairness in the redistribution of public
infrastructure; and the symbolic significance of a large group of people
deciding that they cannot continue to govern themselves together even
under democratic rules and procedures.
308.
309.
310.
311.

Lincoln, supra note 267, at 220.
See Buchanan, supra note 24, at 24.
SeeJacobs, supra note 231, at 26-51.
See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 297-304 (1988).
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To be hopeful about democracy is to disfavor secession and to require compelling evidence before concluding that one polity will not
work for all its people. Secession should be predicated on a showing
that the municipal majority is systematically exploiting the minority, or
at the very least that the majority is advancing only its own values and
consistently ignoring the minority's needs and interests. 3 12 Lincoln
notwithstanding, secession and democracy can coexist where such a
showing is made.
In the case of Staten Island, the democratic presumption against
secession ought to apply. Although the economic, political, and demographic differences between Staten Island and the other four boroughs
have been underscored, those differences should not be exaggerated.
It is far from clear that Staten Islanders are the sort of distinctive minority, let alone an exploited or abused one, for whom secession may
be a necessary antidote for the possible inability of democracy to handle persistent and polarizing differences. Staten Island and New York
City are not divided by language, religion, or historic ethnic or cultural
conflicts. Indeed, as the rapid population growth of Staten Island in
recent decades indicates, many adult Staten Islanders were not born on
the Island but emigrated to it from one of the other four boroughs.
Of course, the standards of linguistic, religious, or longstanding
cultural division typically used to consider the propriety of secession in
the international arena may be a little excessive in debating the organization of local governments. Staten Island is not seeking a seat in the
United Nations or the right to print its own currency, just municipal
independence. It certainly does not have to show that it is as distinctive
from New York City as Lithuania is from Russia or Quebec from the
rest of Canada.
Nevertheless, even at the local level, the distinctiveness of Staten
Islanders may be exaggerated. Although the Board of Estimate is gone,
there does not appear to be anything in the City's political structure
that would inhibit Staten Islanders' ability to make common cause with
middle-class homeowners in the other "outer boroughs," particularly
Brooklyn and Queens, with respect to tax and fiscal questions or the
municipal services to be supported or opposed in the allocation of the
City's resources. Indeed, middle-class outer-borough homeowners remain a potent force in the City's politics. 3 13 Moreover, whatever the
successes or failures of this group in the City's politics, there is no evidence that Staten Islanders are distinctively worse off than other middle-class homeowners. To authorize the secession of Staten Island on
the grounds of some sort of economic or social distinctiveness could
lead to the further disaggregation of the City on economic or social
312. See Buchanan, supra note 24, at 38-45 (defending secession when necessary
to escape discriminatory redistribution).
313. See, e.g., Sam Roberts, The Budget Battles; The Twisting Road to a Budget
Deal, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1991, at B5.
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The more plausible argument for secession is site-specific exploitation; that is, the claim that because Staten Islanders are not just relatively small in numbers but also "discrete and insular"-or, rather,
discrete because they are insular-the City is loading up their Island
with locally undesirable land uses. Determining the justice of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article. However, it can be noted that,
first, many other neighborhoods in the City, particularly minority communities, can and have made the same argument;3 15 and second, this
argument tends to be one-sided, ignoring the City's creation and maintenance of facilities on Staten Island that benefit Staten Islanders. It
may be that Staten Islanders can make out a case for land use exploitation, and that such exploitation would justify secession, but a clear and
convincing case of site-specific
exploitation should be required before
3 16
secession is allowed.
In the absence of such a showing, a hopeful commitment to democracy, like a concern for the loss of a central city tax base, militates
against secession. Although secession might increase the possibilities
for participatory democracy on Staten Island itself, secession would be
a significant, albeit symbolic, pronouncement about the failure of democracy in a heterogeneous urban setting. The secession of Staten
Island would be a statement that the diverse races, classes, and income
groups that make up New York City and share in the City's economy
and cultural institutions are unable to work together toward the common enterprise of regional self-government. It would be a statement
that these differences within the City are sufficiently irreconcilable as to
require such a municipal divorce. And that would be a very sad statement indeed.
C. Beyond Secession: A Postscript
Although the case for secession in terms of the "over-all public
interest" of the New York metropolitan area is uncertain, there may be
some lessons for New York City from the Staten Island secession movement and from the review of the theoretical literature on metropolitan
governance. The strengths of a consolidated government like Greater
New York's is its capacity to provide area-wide functions and to call
upon a broad, five-borough tax base to serve the needs of all City residents. Its weaknesses, as the public choice and political participation
314. The Staten Island secession movement has inspired a secession effort on
behalf of New York's largest middle-class borough, Queens. See Kevin Sack, State
Senate Passes Bill to Allow Queens to Begin Secession Effort, N.Y. Times, Apr. 29,
1992, at B4.
315. See, e.g., Jill Weiner, A Toilet Bowl Is in Our Backyard, N.Y. Newsday, Jan.
15, 1992, at 79 (interview with Peggy Shepard).
316. Cf. Buchanan, supra note 24, at 38-45 (justifying secession when necessary
to escape discriminatory redistribution).
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critiques suggest, are its lack of both accountability for delivery of local

services and popular participation in governance.
Staten Island's complaints about the costs and quality of local public services, municipal land use and siting decisions, and insufficient attention from City Hall are shared by many other City neighborhoods.
Indeed, Staten Island's small population, determinate borders, and historical identity suggest not that it is more likely to be exploited, but
rather that is easier for Staten Islanders to organize and articulate the
kinds of community concerns generic for most New Yorkers. 1 7 The
intense disaffection with the cost, ineffectiveness, and insensitivity of
the City's government that the secession movement has revealed on
Staten Island is no doubt shared by many other areas on the City.
Rather than simply either ignore secession or move to block it in
the legislature or in the courts, 18s the City should take seriously the
message behind the secession movement and begin to consider possible ways to restructure its government to decrease the central municipal bureaucracy, increase the role of neighborhoods in planning3 1 9 and
overseeing the delivery of public services, and promote substantive fair3 20
ness in the siting of locally undesirable land uses.
Although the Mor-is decision precludes the form of municipal federalism that would give local subunits more representation in City government than "one person, one vote," would allow, there is nothing to

prevent, and much to encourage the use of subunit lines for the decentralization of service delivery and community participation in planning
and public decision-making. The City could continue to utilize the fis317. See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
and the Theory of Groups 53 (1965) (showing "the greater effectiveness of small
groups"); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Caroene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 727
(1985) (arguing that sociologically diffuse groups are less successful than non-diffuse
groups).
318. The success of the secession measure in the legislature in 1989 and 1990
raises questions about the City's ability ultimately to block secession enabling legislation
through legislative lobbying. Indeed, since secession would return to the legislature
only after the Staten Island electorate has voted to separate from New York City, the
rhetoric of local popular self-determination could give secession very powerful
momentum. As for judicial protection, the ultimate significance of the Court of Appeals'
decision in the Secession Referendum case is difficult to divine. Although two members
of the court were willing to block even the initial secession referendum on home rule
grounds, and the court majority avoided any clear pronouncement on the home rule
question, see supra text accompanying notes 190-192, the home rule case law counsels
against any certainty that the court would invalidate a secession enabling law.
319. One step in this direction is section 197-a of the new City Charter, which
permits boroughs and communities to initiate their own plans for land use development
and growth and requires the City Planning Commission to develop rules for the
provision of the technical assistance necessary for such plans to satisfy state and local
environmental impact analysis. See 1990 N.Y. Laws 34, ch. 17, § 197-a.
320. This is the intent of sections 203 and 204 of the new City Charter, which
require the development and utilization of "fair share" criteria for the location of city
facilities. See 1990 N.Y. Laws 35, chap. 17, §§ 203-204.
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cal resources of the City as a whole and maintain City-wide political
institutions for the deliberation of City-wide policy questions and resource allocations, but subunits could be used as focal points for
greater public involvement, enhanced government accountability, and
improved service performance. Such structural changes could realize
some of the economic and political benefits of a secession while preserving the City's tax base, avoiding the negative redistribution that secession would occasion, and symbolizing the potential of selfgovernment to work, even in the most complex, heterogenous, and
conflict-ridden urban setting.

